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作者：Anderson, Edward; Chen, Bo; Shao, Lusheng
作者单位：University of Sydney; University of Warwick; University of Melbourne
摘要：When a firm faces an uncertain demand, it is common to procure supply using some type of option in addition to spot purchases. A typical version of this problem involves capacity being purchased in advance, with a separate payment made that applies only to the part of the capacity that is needed. We consider a discrete version of this problem in which competing suppliers choose a reservation price and an execution price for blocks of capacity, and the buyer, facing known distributions of deman...
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作者：Smith, James E.; Ulu, Canan
作者单位：Duke University; Georgetown University
摘要：We use a dynamic programming model to study the impacts of risk aversion on information acquisition in technology adoption decisions. In this model, the benefit of the technology is uncertain and, in each period, the decision maker (DM) may adopt the technology, reject the technology, or pay to acquire a signal about the benefit of the technology. The dynamic programming state variables are the DM's wealth and a probability distribution that describes the DM's beliefs about the benefit of the ...
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作者：Asadpour, Arash; Goemans, Michel X.; Madry, Aleksander; Gharan, Shayan Oveis; Saberi, Amin
作者单位：New York University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Stanford University
摘要：We present a randomized O(log n /log log n)-approximation algorithm for the asymmetric traveling salesman problem (ATSP). This provides the first asymptotic improvement over the long-standing Theta(log n)-approximation bound stemming from the work of Frieze et al. (1982) [ Frieze AM, Galbiati G, Maffioki F (1982) On the worst-case performance of some algorithms for the asymmetric traveling salesman problem. Networks 12(1): 23-39]. The key ingredient of our approach is a new connection between ...
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作者：Balseiro, Santiago R.; Candogan, Ozan
作者单位：Duke University; University of Chicago
摘要：In online advertising, the prevalent method advertisers employ to acquire impressions is to contract with an intermediary. These contracts involve upfront payments made by the advertisers to the intermediary, in exchange for running campaigns on their behalf. This paper studies the optimal contract offered by the intermediary in a setting where advertisers' budgets and targeting criteria are private. This problem can naturally be formulated as a multidimensional mechanism design problem, which...
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作者：Wang, Liao; Yao, David D.
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：Demand for many products may depend on the price of a tradable asset or on the economy in general. For example, demand for equipment that plants or harvests corn correlates with the corn price on the commodity market, and discount stores experienced increased sales revenue during the last recession. Thus, we model demand as a stochastic process with two components: in addition to the usual Gaussian component reflecting demand volatility, there is a drift component taking the form of a function...
