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作者：Cao, Yufeng; Rusmevichientong, Paat; Topaloglu, Huseyin
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University; University of Southern California
摘要：We consider assortment optimization problems when customers choose under a mixture of independent demand and multinomial logit models. In the assortment optimization setting, each product has a fixed revenue associatedwith it. The customers choose among the products according to our mixture choice model. The goal is to find an assortment that maximizes the expected revenue from a customer. We show that we can find the optimal assortment by solving a linear program. We establish that the optima...
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作者：Cao, Junyu; Qi, Wei
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Tsinghua University
摘要：Urban open space emerges as a new territory to embrace retail innovations. Selling products in public spaces with wheeled stalls can potentially become ubiquitous in our future cities. Transition into such a stall economy paradigm is being spurred by the rapidly advancing self-driving technologies. Motivated by this transformation, this paper provides models, theory, and insights of spatial queueing systems, in which one server moves around to meet mobile customers/machines and in which the la...
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作者：Goyal, Vineet; Udwani, Rajan
作者单位：Columbia University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：The problem of online matching with stochastic rewards is a generalization of the online bipartitematching problemwhere each edge has a probability of success. When a match is made it succeeds with the probability of the corresponding edge. We consider the more general vertex-weighted version of the problem and give two new results. First, we show that a natural generalization of the perturbed-greedy algorithm is (1 - 1/e) competitive when probabilities decompose as a product of two factors, o...
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作者：Baldacci, Bastien; Manziuk, Iuliia; Mastrolia, Thibaut; Rosenbaum, Mathieu
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We consider the issue of a market maker acting at the same time in the lit and dark pools of an exchange. The exchange wishes to establish a suitable make-take fee policy to attract transactions on its venues. We first solve the stochastic control problem of the market maker without the intervention of the exchange. Then, we derive the equations defining the optimal contract to be set between the market maker and the exchange. This contract depends on the trading flows generated by the market ...
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作者：Swamy, Rahul; King, Douglas M.; Jacobson, Sheldon H.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：Political districting in the United States is a decennial process of redrawing the boundaries of congressional and state legislative districts. The notion of fairness in political districting has been an important topic of subjective debate, with district plans affecting a wide range of stakeholders, including the voters, candidates, and political parties. Even though districting as an optimization problem has been well studied, existing models primarily rely on nonpolitical fairness measures ...
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作者：Chen, Xi; Miao, Sentao; Wang, Yining
作者单位：New York University; McGill University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：In recent decades, the advance of information technology and abundant personal data facilitate the application of algorithmic personalized pricing. However, this leads to the growing concern of potential violation of privacy because of adversarial attack. To address the privacy issue, this paper studies a dynamic personalized pricing problem with unknown nonparametric demand models under data privacy protection. Two concepts of data privacy, which have been widely applied in practices, are int...
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作者：Kash, Ian A.; Key, Peter B.; Zoumpoulis, Spyros I.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; INSEAD Business School
摘要：In the context of subscription-based services, many technologies improve over time, and service providers can provide increasingly powerful service upgrades to their customers but at a launching cost and the expense of the sales of existing products. We propose a model of technology upgrades and characterize the optimal pricing and timing of technology introductions for a service provider who price-discriminates among customers based on their upgrade experience in the face of customers who are...
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作者：Birge, John R.; Capponi, Agostino; Chen, Peng-Chu
作者单位：University of Chicago; Columbia University; University of Hong Kong
摘要：We study systemic risk in a supply chain network where firms are connected through purchase orders. Firms can be hit by cost or demand shocks, which can cause defaults. These shocks propagate through the supply chain network via input-output linkages between buyers and suppliers. Firms endogenously take contingency plans to mitigate the impact generated from disruptions. We show that, as long as firms have large initial equity buffers, network fragility is low if both buyer diversification and...
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作者：Grabisch, Michel; Mandel, Antoine; Rusinowska, Agnieszka
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
摘要：We propose a model of the joint evolution of opinions and social relationships in a setting in which social influence decays over time. The dynamics are based on bounded confidence: social connections between individuals with distant opinions are severed, whereas new connections are formed between individuals with similar opinions. Our model naturally gives rise to strong diversity, that is, the persistence of heterogeneous opinions in connected societies, a phenomenon that most existing model...
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作者：Behnezhad, Soheil; Dehghani, Sina; Derakhshan, Mahsa; Hajiaghayi, Mohammedtaghi; Seddighin, Saeed
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：In the Colonel Blotto game, which was initially introduced by Borel in 1921, two colonels simultaneously distribute their troops across different battlefields. The winner of each battlefield is determined independently by a winner-takes-all rule. The ultimate payoff for each colonel is the number of battlefields won. The Colonel Blotto game is commonly used for analyzing a wide range of applications from the U.S. Presidential election to innovative technology competitions to advertising, sport...
