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作者：Ata, Baris; Barjesteh, Nasser
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Toronto
摘要：We consider a make-to-stock manufacturing system selling multiple products to price-sensitive customers. The system manager seeks to maximize the long-run average profit by making dynamic pricing, outsourcing, and scheduling decisions. First, she adjusts prices dynamically depending on the systemstate. Second, when the backlog ofwork is judged to be excessive, she may outsource new orders, thereby incurring outsourcing costs. Third, she decides dynamically which product to prioritize in the ma...
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作者：Bimpikis, Kostas; Mantegazza, Giacomo
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Two-sided platforms play an important role in reducing frictions and facilitating trade, and in doing so they increasingly engage in collecting and processing data about supply and demand. This paper establishes that platforms have an incentive to strategically disclose (coarse) information about demand to the supply side, as this can considerably boost their profits. However, this practice may also adversely affect the welfare of consumers. By optimally designing its information disclosure po...
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作者：Grabisch, Michel; Mandel, Antoine; Rusinowska, Agnieszka
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
摘要：We propose a model of the joint evolution of opinions and social relationships in a setting in which social influence decays over time. The dynamics are based on bounded confidence: social connections between individuals with distant opinions are severed, whereas new connections are formed between individuals with similar opinions. Our model naturally gives rise to strong diversity, that is, the persistence of heterogeneous opinions in connected societies, a phenomenon that most existing model...
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作者：Behnezhad, Soheil; Dehghani, Sina; Derakhshan, Mahsa; Hajiaghayi, Mohammedtaghi; Seddighin, Saeed
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：In the Colonel Blotto game, which was initially introduced by Borel in 1921, two colonels simultaneously distribute their troops across different battlefields. The winner of each battlefield is determined independently by a winner-takes-all rule. The ultimate payoff for each colonel is the number of battlefields won. The Colonel Blotto game is commonly used for analyzing a wide range of applications from the U.S. Presidential election to innovative technology competitions to advertising, sport...
