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作者：Alaei, Saeed; Belloni, Alexandre; Makhdoumi, Ali; Malekian, Azarakhsh
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Duke University; Amazon.com; University of Toronto
摘要：Consider a mechanism run by an auctioneer who can use both payment and inspection instruments to incentivize agents. The timeline of the events is as follows. Based on a prespecified allocation rule and the reported values of agents, the auctioneer allocates the item and secures the reported values as deposits. The auctioneer then inspects the values of agents and, using a prespecified reward rule, rewards the ones who have reported truthfully. Using techniques from convex analysis and calculu...
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作者：Caldentey, Rene; Haugh, Martin B.
作者单位：University of Chicago; Imperial College London
摘要：We study Cournot competition among firms in a multimarket framework where each of the firms face different budget/capacity constraints. We assume independent linear inverse demand functions for each market and completely characterize the resulting unique equilibrium. Specifically, we introduce the notions of augmented and cutoff budgets for firms and markets, respectively. We show, for example, that firm i operates in market j if and only if firm i's augmented budget is greater than market j's...
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作者：Ata, Baris; Belloni, Alexandre; Candogan, Ozan
作者单位：University of Chicago; Duke University
摘要：We consider a platform that serves (observable) agents, who belong to a larger network that also includes additional agents who are not served by the platform. We refer to the latter group of agents as latent agents. Associated with each agent are the agent's covariate and outcome. The platform has access to past covariates and outcomes of the observable agents, but no data for the latent agents is available to the platform. Crucially, the agents influence each other's outcome through a certai...
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作者：Schindler, Kilian; Rujeerapaiboon, Napat; Kuhn, Daniel; Wiesemann, Wolfram
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne; National University of Singapore; Imperial College London
摘要：Peak/off-peak spreads on European electricity forward and spot markets are eroding due to the ongoing nuclear phaseout in Germany and the steady growth in photovoltaic capacity. The reduced profitability of peak/off-peak arbitrage forces hydropower producers to recover part of their original profitability on the reserve markets. We propose a bilayer stochastic programming framework for the optimal operation of a fleet of interconnected hydropower plants that sells energy on both the spot and t...
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作者：Deshpande, Vinayak; Mundru, Nishanth; Rath, Sandeep; Knowles, Martyn; Rowe, David; Wood, Benjamin C.
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine
摘要：Surgical procedures account for over 60% of the operating cost of a hospital. About 15% of these costs are related to surgical instruments and supplies. Hospitals spend several million dollars annually on instrument sterilization, instrument tray assembly, and instrument repurchase costs. However, in a large majority of hospitals, less than 20%-30% of reusable instruments supplied to a surgery are used on average. Prior implementations of surgical tray rationalizations have typically been expe...
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作者：Chen, Xin; Li, Menglong
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; City University of Hong Kong
摘要：We propose a new concept of S-convex functions (and its variant, semi strictly quasi -S-(SSQS)-convex functions) to study substitute structures in economics and operations models with continuous variables. We develop a host of fundamental properties and characterizations of S-convex functions, including various preservation properties, conjugate relationships with submodular and convex functions, and characterizations using Hessians. For a divisible market, we show that the utility function sa...
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作者：Huang, Weihuan; Lin, Nifei; Hong, L. Jeff
作者单位：Nanjing University; Fudan University; Fudan University; Fudan University
摘要：CoVaR is one of the most important measures of financial systemic risks. It is defined as the risk of a financial portfolio conditional on another financial portfolio being at risk. In this paper we first develop a Monte Carlo simulation-based batching estimator of CoVaR and study its consistency and asymptotic normality. We show that the best rate of convergence that the batching estimator can achieve is n(-1/3), where n is the sample size. We then develop an importance sampling-inspired esti...
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作者：Keppo, Jussi; Touzi, Nizar; Zuo, Ruiting
作者单位：National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; New York University; New York University Tandon School of Engineering; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (Guangzhou)
摘要：We study incentive contracts in asset management business under dynamic actions and relationships between an investor, a partner of an investment company, and a fund manager of the company. Both the manager and the partner exert costly effort to manage the investments. The investor cannot perfectly observe the partner's and manager's actions, and similarly, the partner cannot perfectly observe the manager's actions. Thus, we consider a hierarchical contracting framework under hidden efforts, w...
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作者：Ghosal, Shubhechyya; Ho, Chin Pang; Wiesemann, Wolfram
作者单位：Imperial College London; City University of Hong Kong
摘要：We propose a generic model for the capacitated vehicle routing problem (CVRP) under demand uncertainty. By combining risk measures, satisficing measures, or disutility functions with complete or partial characterizations of the probability distribution governing the demands, our formulation bridges the popular but often independently studied paradigms of stochastic programming and distributionally robust optimization. We characterize when an uncertainty-affected CVRP is (not) amenable to a sol...
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作者：Fallah, Alireza; Makhdoumi, Ali; Malekian, Azarakhsh; Ozdaglar, Asuman
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Duke University; University of Toronto
摘要：We consider a platform's problem of collecting data from privacy sensitive users to estimate an underlying parameter of interest. We formulate this question as a Bayesianoptimal mechanism design problem, in which an individual can share their (verifiable) data in exchange for a monetary reward or services, but at the same time has a (private) heterogeneous privacy cost which we quantify using differential privacy. We consider two popular differential privacy settings for providing privacy guar...
