-
作者：Dutting, Paul; Fischer, Felix; Parkes, David C.
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; University of London; Queen Mary University London; Harvard University
摘要：We consider the classical model of sponsored search due to Edelman et al. and Varian and examine how robust standard position auctions are to a misspecification of the position-dependent quality factors used by this model. We show that under both complete and incomplete information a nontruthful position auction admits an efficient equilibrium for a strictly broader range of parameter values than the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, which would be truthful if the parameters were specifie...
-
作者：Nie, Jiawang; Tang, Xindong
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Hong Kong Polytechnic University
摘要：We consider multiclass make-to-stock production/inventory systems in which the manager makes three decisions, including pricing, outsourcing, and scheduling, to maximize the long-run average profit. For a sequence of systems in the heavy-traffic regime, with linear or strictly convex holding/waiting cost functions, we propose a sequence of policies and establish its asymptotic optimality. Our proof combines the lower bound approach and a thorough steady-state analysis of the systems. We also e...
-
作者：Mahara, Ryoga
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：Envy freeness is one of the most widely studied notions in fair division. Because envy-free allocations do not always exist when items are indivisible, several relaxations have been considered. Among them, possibly the most compelling notion is envy freeness up to any item (EFX). Informally speaking, EFX requires that no agent i envies another agent j after the removal of any item in j's bundle. The existence of EFX allocations is a major open problem. We study the existence of EFX allocations...
