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作者:Breugem, Thomas; Van Wassenhove, Luk N.
作者单位:INSEAD Business School
摘要:Vertical equity or fairness is an important aspect in many settings, yet has received relatively little attention in the literature. Recent developments underline the practical relevance (e.g., COVID-19 vaccination policies). It plays an important role in the permight require a family-planning organization to allocate a minimum fraction of the total utility (client volume) to a particular player (the high-impact subgroup of the population, e.g., young and poor clients). However, the price (dec...
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作者:Bhargava, Hemant K.; Wang, Kitty; Zhang, Xingyue (Luna)
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Davis; University of Houston System; University of Houston; University of Washington; University of Washington Tacoma
摘要:Many digital platforms have accrued enormous power and scale, leveraging cross-side network effects between the sides they connect (e.g., producers and consumers or creators and viewers). Platforms motivate a diverse spectrum of producers, large and small, to participate by sharing platform revenue with them, predominantly under a linear revenue-sharing scheme with the same commission rate regardless of producer power or size. Under pressure from society, lawsuits, and antitrust investigations...
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作者:Wu, Yue; Gal-Or, Esther; Geylani, Tansev
作者单位:Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要:Native advertising is not fully transparent to consumers because it bears similarity to editorial content. Increasing the opaqueness of native ads can raise publishers??? click-through rate, but can also negatively affect consumers??? quality perception of the publishers??? editorial content and lead to lower profitability. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretical model of native ads to investigate the economic implications of regulation. Our model considers two types of publishers, who di...
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作者:Lix, Katharina; Goldberg, Amir; Srivastava, Sameer B.; Valentine, Melissa A.
作者单位:Stanford University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要:How does cognitive diversity in a group affect its performance? Prior research suggests that group cognitive diversity poses a performance tradeoff: Diverse groups excel at creativity and innovation, but struggle to take coordinated action. Building on the insight that group cognition is not static, but is instead dynamically and interactively produced, we introduce the construct of discursive diversity, a manifestation of group cognitive diversity, which reflects the degree to which the meani...
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作者:Ulku, Sezer; Hydock, Chris; Cui, Shiliang
作者单位:Georgetown University; California State University System; California Polytechnic State University San Luis Obispo
摘要:The traditional queueing literature assumes that service time is largely independent of social influences. However, queues are social systems; and social considerations are therefore likely to impact customers' service time decision to the extent they have control. Through a series of experiments, we show that when others are waiting in line, customers tend to accelerate their own service time, and in doing so, sacrifice their own consumption utility. This behavior is driven by concern for oth...
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作者:Wang, Fan
作者单位:ESSEC Business School
摘要:Nonlinear perception of risk is integrated into models of decision under ambiguity, thereby providing a theoretical basis for behavioral analyses that involve both risk and ambiguity. The main model replaces the risk front of maxmin expected utility by rank dependent utility, and it is derived from simple, observable axioms that are not restricted to expected utility under risk. The model highlights the interaction between risk attitude and ambiguity attitude, and it is compatible with the par...
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作者:Kiessling, Lukas; Radbruch, Jonas; Schaube, Sebastian
作者单位:Max Planck Society; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要:This paper studies how the presence of peers and different peer assignment rules-self-selection versus random assignment-affect individual performance. Using a framed field experiment, we find that the presence of a randomly assigned peer improves performance by 28% of a standard deviation (SD), whereas self-selecting peers induces an additional 15%-18% SD improvement in performance. Our results document peer effects in multiple characteristics and show that self-selection changes these charac...
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作者:Ryvkin, Dmitry
作者单位:State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要:We study dynamic contests between two players whose performance is determined jointly by effort and luck. The players observe each other???s positions in real time. There is a fixed deadline, and the player with a higher performance at the deadline wins the contest. We fully characterize the Markov perfect equilibrium for heterogeneous players. Effort is high when the players are tied but collapses quickly when one of them assumes a lead, due to a dynamic momentum effect. Therefore, total expe...
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作者:Dai, Min; Kou, Steven; Qian, Shuaijie; Wan, Xiangwei
作者单位:Hong Kong Polytechnic University; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; Boston University; National University of Singapore; Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要:The problems of nonconcave utility maximization appear in many areas of finance and economics, such as in behavioral economics, incentive schemes, aspiration utility, and goal-reaching problems. Existing literature solves these problems using the concavification principle. We provide a framework for solving nonconcave utility maximization problems, where the concavification principle may not hold, and the utility functions can be discontinuous. We find that adding portfolio bounds can offer di...
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作者:Lo, Desmond (Ho-Fu); Brahm, Francisco; Dessein, Wouter; Minami, Chieko
作者单位:Santa Clara University; University of London; London Business School; Columbia University; Kobe University
摘要:How does task expertise affect the allocation of attention? Our theory argues that when attention is scarce, expertise and attention are complements: A manager optimally focuses her attention on tasks in which she has relatively more expertise; she manages with style. In contrast, when attention is abundant, attention and expertise become substitutes: A manager shifts her attention toward tasks in which she has less expertise; she manages against her style. Using microlevel data on managers fr...