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作者：Hu, Yue; Chan, Carri W.; Dong, Jing
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：Service systems are typically limited resource environments where scarce capacity is reserved for the most urgent customers. However, there has been a growing interest in the use of proactive service when a less urgent customer may become urgent while waiting. On one hand, providing service for customers when they are less urgent could mean that fewer resources are needed to fulfill their service requirement. On the other hand, using limited capacity for customers who may never need the servic...
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作者：Dey, Debabrata; Ghoshal, Abhijeet; Lahiri, Atanu
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：The role of education and enforcement in ensuring compliance with a law or policy has been debated for more than a century now. We reopen this debate in the context of security circumvention by employees, currently a leading cause of information security and privacy breaches. Drawing on prior literature, we develop a microeconomic framework that captures employees' circumventing behavior in the face of security controls. This allows us to obtain interesting insights that have implications for ...
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作者：Frydman, Cary; Krajbich, Ian
作者单位：University of Southern California; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：The standard assumption in social learning environments is that agents learn from others through choice outcomes. We argue that in many settings, agents can also infer information from others' response times (RT), which can increase efficiency. To investigate this, we conduct a standard information cascade experiment and find that RTs do contain information that is not revealed by choice outcomes alone. When RTs are observable, subjects extract this private information and are more likely to b...
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作者：Avramidis, Panagiotis; Mylonopoulos, Nikolaos; Pennacchi, George G.
作者单位：American College of Greece; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We develop a model of competition between banks and a marketplace lender to motivate empirical tests using local market data on U.S. banks and the largest marketplace lending platform. Employing mergers of large, multimarket banks as an exogenous credit supply shock, we find that marketplace lending absorbs unmet demand for consumer credit following a decline in the availability of bank credit. Merger-induced bank branch closings lead to an increase in marketplace loan requests and loan accept...
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作者：Althuizen, Niek; Chen, Bo
作者单位：Montpellier Business School; Universite de Montpellier; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
摘要：When soliciting novel product ideas from the crowd, companies may opt to show a prototype in order to steer the generation of ideas in the desired direction. On the one hand, the more features the prototype incorporates, the larger the potential for activating relevant knowledge in memory that may serve as a basis for generating novel ideas. On the other hand, it increases the risk of fixation on the incorporated features, which may inhibit the generation of novel ideas. Based on the dual path...
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作者：Soll, Jack B.; Palley, Asa B.; Rader, Christina A.
作者单位：Duke University; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; Colorado College
摘要：Much research on advice taking examines how people revise point estimates given input from others. This work has established that people often egocentrically discount advice. If they were to place more weight on advice, their point estimates would be more accurate. Yet the focus on point estimates and accuracy has resulted in a narrow conception of what it means to heed advice. We distinguish between revisions of point estimates and revisions of attendant probability distributions. Point estim...
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作者：Davis, Andrew M.; Hu, Bin; Hyndman, Kyle; Qi, Anyan
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：We study an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) purchasing two inputs for assembly from two suppliers with private cost information. The OEM can contract with the two suppliers either simultaneously or sequentially. We consider both cases in which the OEM has relatively equal bargaining power (the dynamic bargaining institution) or substantial bargaining power (the mechanism design institution). For the dynamic bargaining institution, we show that in sequential bargaining, the supply chain p...
