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作者：Botelho, Tristan L.; Gertsberg, Marina
作者单位：Yale University; University of Melbourne
摘要：We theorize that status awards will have a disciplining effect on evaluators, changing how they evaluate. Specifically, status awards will lead evaluators to place less weight on unreliable indicators of candidate quality, such as gender. We test this theory using data from restaurant evaluations on Yelp, focusing on the relationship between an evaluator's restaurant rating and their reporting of being served by a man or a woman in their review text. We use Yelp's evaluator status award (Elite...
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作者：Yang, Mingwen; Zheng, Zhiqiang (Eric); Mookerjee, Vijay
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：In social trading, less experienced investors (followers) are allowed to copy the trades of experts (traders) in real time after paying a fee. Such a copy-trading mechanism often runs into a transparency-revenue tension. On the one hand, social trading platforms need to release traders' trades as transparently as possible to allow followers to evaluate traders accurately. On the other hand, complete transparency may undercut the platform's revenue because followers can free ride. That is, foll...
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作者：Arnosti, Nick; Randolph, Tim
作者单位：Columbia University; Columbia University
摘要：We analyze the parallel lottery that is used to allocate hunting permits in the state of Alaska. Each participant is given tickets to distribute among lotteries for different types of items. Participants who win multiple items receive their favorite, and new winners are drawn from the lotteries with unclaimed items. When supply is scarce, equilibrium outcomes of parallel lotteries approximate a competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI), which is Pareto efficient. When supply is moderat...
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作者：Hackbarth, Dirk; Taub, Bart
作者单位：Boston University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; European Corporate Governance Institute; University of Glasgow
摘要：We study anticompetitive horizontal mergers in a dynamic model with noisy collusion. At each instant, firms either privately choose output levels or merge to form a monopoly, trading off the benefits of avoiding price wars against the costs of merging. The potential to merge decreases pre-merger collusion, as punishments effected by price wars are weakened. We thus extend the result of Davidson and Deneckere [Davidson C, Deneckere R (1984) Horizontal mergers and collusive behavior. Internat. J...
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作者：Du, Longyuan; Hu, Ming; Wu, Jiahua
作者单位：University of San Francisco; University of Toronto; Imperial College London
摘要：We consider a sales effort management problem under an all-or-nothing constraint. The seller will receive no bonus/revenue if the sales volume fails to reach a predetermined target at the end of the sales horizon. Throughout the sales horizon, the sales process can be moderated by the seller through costly effort. We show that the optimal sales rate is nonmonotonic with respect to the remaining time or the outstanding sales volume required to reach the target. Generally, it has a watershed str...
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作者：Bhargava, Hemant K.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：Many digital platforms give users a bundle of goods sourced from numerous creators, generate revenue through consumption of these goods, and motivate creators by sharing of revenue. This paper studies the platform's design choices and creators' participation and supply decisions when users' (viewers') consumption of goods (content) is financed by third-party advertisers. The model specifies the platform's scale: number of creators and content supplied and magnitudes of viewers, advertisers, an...
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作者：Wu, Xiaole; Zhang, Fuqiang; Zhou, Yu
作者单位：Fudan University; Washington University (WUSTL); Chongqing University
摘要：When a weak-brand firm and a strong-brand firm source from a common contract manufacturer, the weak-brand firm may advertise this relationship to promote its own product. This paper investigates whether the weak-brand firm should use such brand spillover as a marketing strategy and how this decision depends on the firms' characteristics and market conditions. We develop a game theoretic model consisting of one contract manufacturer and two firms with asymmetric brand power. The contract manufa...
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作者：Gretschko, Vitali; Pollrich, Martin
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Bonn
摘要：We analyze the problem of a buyer who purchases a long-term project from one of several suppliers. A changing state of the world influences the costs of the suppliers. We distinguish between complete contracts conditioning on all future realizations of the state of the world and incomplete contracts renegotiated whenever the state of the world changes. We provide conditions such that incomplete contracting does not pose a problem. If the changing state of the world is publicly observable and t...
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作者：Martinez-de-Albeniz, Victor; Kunnumkal, Sumit
作者单位：University of Navarra; IESE Business School; Indian School of Business (ISB)
摘要：Integrating inventory and assortment planning decisions is a challenging task that requires comparing the value of demand expansion through broader choice for consumers with the value of higher in-stock availability. We develop a stockout-based substitution model for trading off these values in a setting with inventory replenishment, a feature missing in the literature. Using the closed form solution for the single-product case, we develop an accurate approximation for the multiproduct case. T...
