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作者：Feng, Josh; Maini, Luca
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Harvard University; Harvard Medical School
摘要：Do pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) reduce spending on prescription drugs? Reduced -form evidence suggests that PBMs enforce a tradeoff between net -of -rebate prices and access to drugs within each market. However, net -of -rebate prices grow consistently over time and appear unresponsive to competitor entry. We argue that inertia in drug demand can reconcile these facts. To formally analyze the roles played by PBMs and demand inertia, we build a dynamic structural model of drug pricing and e...
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作者：Dobrescu, Loretti; Motta, Alberto; Shanker, Akshay
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Sydney
摘要：As part of a term-long anonymous assessment, thousands of undergraduate university students were divided into groups, each led by a randomly selected peer. The leader's gender had no effect on the assessment's outcomes, but female students led by a female peer achieved 0.26 standard deviations (SD) higher course grades when the gender of the leader was revealed. They also outperformed by 0.22 SD their counterparts in groups in which the leader's gender was revealed to be male. The mechanism in...
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作者：Dambra, Michael; Velikov, Mihail; Weber, Joseph
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Buffalo, SUNY; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We examine how managers' disclosure decisions vary in response to monetary policy shocks. Specifically, we examine the extent to which firms issue Forms 8-K, press releases, and management forecasts following unexpected changes to the target federal funds rate. We find consistent evidence that unexpected decreases (increases) in the Federal Open Market Committee target rate lead to larger increases (decreases) in disclosure by firms that are more sensitive to monetary policy shocks. Furthermor...
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作者：Li, Chen
作者单位：New York University; NYU Shanghai
摘要：I develop two empirical models to quantify agency friction caused by moral hazard in top management teams. They capture shareholders' distinct perspectives on compensating top managers: the Individual Model, in which managers in a firm unilaterally shirk, and the Team Model, in which managers choose effort jointly. The Team Model rationalizes observed compensation better than the Individual Model, underlining the importance of managerial coordination and team -based incentives. This paper also...
