-
作者：Lee, Yeonjoon
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：I study the role of vertical incentives between upstream issuers and downstream brokers in the retail bond market when there exist agency problems. Although arms-length transaction regulations require that vertical incentives not influence their activities, I show that both upstream issuers and downstream brokers are sensitive to vertical incentives. I then present a structural model in order to measure the degree of vertical incentives for downstream brokers, controlling for the extent of age...
-
作者：Martin, Melissa; Timmermans, Oscar
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Relative performance evaluation has become an increasingly common component of executive compensation contracts. We study how these incentive plans relate to corporate disclosure and predict that they introduce an incremental disclosure cost. This cost arises because disclosures can help competitors make better investment decisions, enhancing their performance and thereby reducing managers' expected compensation. Consistent with this prediction, we find a negative association between relative ...
-
作者：Bae, Joonho; Kapuscinski, Roman; Silberholz, John
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：Despite the great potential benefits of battery energy storage systems (BESSs) to electrical grids, most standalone uses of BESS are not economical due to batteries' high upfront costs and limited lifespans. Energy stacking, a strategy of providing two or more services with a single BESS, has been of great interest to improve profitability. However, some key questions, for example, the underlying mechanism by which stacking works or why and how much it may improve profitability, remain unanswe...
-
作者：Barardehi, Yashar; Bird, Andrew; Karolyi, Stephen; Ruchti, Thomas
作者单位：Chapman University System; Chapman University; United States Department of the Treasury; Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; United States Department of the Treasury; Office of Financial Research
摘要：Despite strong theoretical predictions based on disagreement, limited empirical evidence links short-selling restrictions to higher prices. We test this relationship using quasi-experimental methods based on rule 201, a threshold-based policy that restricts aggressive short selling when intraday returns cross -10%. When comparing stocks on either side of the threshold in the same hour of trading, we find that the restriction leads to 8% lower short-sale volume and 35 basis points higher daily ...
-
作者：Cao, Wenjiao; Jia, Yuping; Zeng, Yachang
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Frankfurt School Finance & Management; Nanyang Technological University
摘要：We propose an empirical measure of the types of financial misreporting based on misreporting incentives. We identify three distinct types: (1) misreporting driven by top executives' wealth pursuits, (2) misreporting induced by capital market pressure, and (3) misreporting by subordinates due to inadequate management oversight. Our measure is developed by conducting a detailed analysis of the textual data from U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases....
-
作者：Balakrishnan, Maya; Ferreira, Kris Johnson; Tong, Jordan
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Harvard University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Even if algorithms make better predictions than humans on average, humans may sometimes have private information that an algorithm does not have access to that can improve performance. How can we help humans effectively use and adjust recommendations made by algorithms in such situations? When deciding whether and how to override an algorithm's recommendations, we hypothesize that people are biased toward following na & iuml;ve advice-weighting (NAW) behavior; they take a weighted average betw...
-
作者：Canales, Rodrigo; Santini, Juan Francisco; Magana, Marina Gonzalez; Cherem, Alexis
作者单位：Boston University; The World Bank
摘要：Research on organizational justice shows that perceptions of justice by internal and external agents are reliable predictors of key organizational outcomes. But how can promote the enactment of fair behavior by those with decision-making authority within organizations? This is particularly important for organizations that depend on frequent client interactions, in which individual discretion is required to make consequential decisions, and where necessary evils are unavoidable. Few organizatio...
-
作者：Valenti, Albert; Miller, Chadwick J.; Tucker, Catherine E.
作者单位：University of Navarra; IESE Business School; Washington State University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Retargeted advertising that tries to entice potential customers back to a website is widely used by advertisers and has often replaced more traditional forms of targeting, such as contextual targeting that tries to match ads to website content. However, existing research has not investigated the extent to which these different targeting techniques compete with or complement each other. To investigate this, we conduct a large-scale field experiment with an automobile manufacturer to investigate...
-
作者：Nan, Lin; Tang, Chao; Ye, Minlei
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of Toronto; University Toronto Mississauga
摘要：This paper investigates the impact of promoting whistleblowing on audit quality and the efficiency of detecting misstatements. On the one hand, whistleblowing alerts the enforcer to the possibility of a misstatement and intensifies the regulatory effort, thereby incentivizing the auditor to improve audit quality. On the other hand, promoting whistleblowing reduces the enforcer's investigative effort when there is no whistleblowing allegation, which in turn dampens the auditor's incentive to en...
-
作者：Li, Xinyu; Schnedler, Wendelin
作者单位：University of Paderborn
摘要：Teams are formed because input from different people is needed. Providing incentives to team members, however, can be difficult. According to received wisdom, declaring all members responsible fails because real responsibility for team output diffuses. But why? Also, why and when does formally declaring one member responsible mean that this member can be attributed real responsibility? We offer a model that answers these questions. We identify when jointly declaring a team responsible results ...
