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作者：Pieroth, Fabian R.; Kohring, Nils; Bichler, Martin
作者单位：Technical University of Munich
摘要：We compute equilibrium strategies in multistage games with continuous signal and action spaces as they are widely used in the management sciences and economics. Examples include sequential sales via auctions, multistage elimination contests, and Stackelberg competitions. In sequential auctions, analysts performing equilibrium analysis are required to derive not just single bids but bid functions for all possible signals or values that a bidder might have in multiple stages. Because of the cont...
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作者：Lin, Yunduan; Zhang, Heng; Zhang, Renyu; Shen, Zuo-Jun Max
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; Arizona State University-Tempe; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Hong Kong; University of Hong Kong
摘要：Nonprogressive diffusion models the spread of behavior on social networks, where agents are allowed to reverse their decisions as time evolves. To provide an efficient framework for evaluating and optimizing nonprogressive diffusion, we introduce a comprehensive model along with a fixed-point approximation (FPA) scheme, which admits both theoretical guarantee and computational efficiency. We show that the approximation error depends on the network structure and derive order-optimal bounds for ...
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作者：Guo, Cheng; Bodur, Merve; Taylor, Joshua A.
作者单位：Clemson University; University of Edinburgh; University of Edinburgh; Heriot Watt University; New Jersey Institute of Technology
摘要：Optimization problems with discrete decisions are nonconvex and thus lack strong duality, which limits the usefulness of tools such as shadow prices. It was shown in Burer (2009) that mixed-binary quadratic programs can be written as completely positive programs, which are convex. We apply this perspective by writing unit commitment in power systems as a completely positive program and then using the dual copositive program and strong duality to design new pricing mechanisms. We show that the ...
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作者：Schwab, Stephen D.
作者单位：University of Texas at San Antonio; University of Texas System; University of Texas at San Antonio
摘要：When a member of a work team leaves, some knowledge is lost to the organization. Exploiting quasi-random turnover among military physicians because of deployments, I estimate the effects of turnover on patients and other providers in the same care team. I find that a discontinuity in primary care leads to a 3%-5% increase in costs driven primarily by an increase in the use and intensity of specialty care with no observable benefit to the patient as measured by potential reductions in hospitali...
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作者：Choi, Jay Pil; Kim, Kyungmin; Mukherjee, Arijit
作者单位：Michigan State University; Yonsei University; Emory University
摘要：Platform-run marketplaces may exploit third-party sellers' data to develop competing products, but the threat of future competition can deter sellers' entry. We explore how this trade-off affects the platform's entry on the marketplace and the referral fee it charges to the third-party sellers. We first characterize the platform's optimal fee under different degrees of commitment on its own entry policy. We show that full commitment maximizes not only the platform's payoff but also consumer su...
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作者：Han, Eojin; Nohadani, Omid
作者单位：University of Notre Dame
摘要：Sequential decision making often requires dynamic policies, which are computationally not tractable in general. Decision rules provide approximate solutions by restricting decisions to simple functions of uncertainties. In this paper, we consider a nonparametric lifting framework where the uncertainty space is lifted to higher dimensions to obtain nonlinear decision rules. Current lifting-based approaches require predetermined functions and are parametric. We propose two nonparametric liftings...
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作者：Bapna, Sofia; Funk, Russell J.
作者单位：University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：This article may be used only for the purposes of research, teaching, and/or private study. Commercial use or systematic downloading (by robots or other automatic processes) is prohibited without explicit Publisher approval, unless otherwise noted. For more information, contact permissions@informs.org. The Publisher does not warrant or guarantee the article's accuracy, completeness, merchantability, fitness inclusion of an advertisement in this article, neither constitutes nor implies a guaran...
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作者：Barardehi, Yashar; Bird, Andrew; Karolyi, Stephen; Ruchti, Thomas
作者单位：Chapman University System; Chapman University; United States Department of the Treasury; Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; Office of Financial Research; United States Department of the Treasury
摘要：Despite strong theoretical predictions based on disagreement, limited empirical evidence links short-selling restrictions to higher prices. We test this relationship using quasi-experimental methods based on rule 201, a threshold-based policy that restricts aggressive short selling when intraday returns cross -10%. When comparing stocks on either side of the threshold in the same hour of trading, we find that the restriction leads to 8% lower short-sale volume and 35 basis points higher daily ...
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作者：Cao, Wenjiao; Jia, Yuping; Zeng, Yachang
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Frankfurt School Finance & Management; Nanyang Technological University
摘要：We propose an empirical measure of the types of financial misreporting based on misreporting incentives. We identify three distinct types: (1) misreporting driven by top executives' wealth pursuits, (2) misreporting induced by capital market pressure, and (3) misreporting by subordinates due to inadequate management oversight. Our measure is developed by conducting a detailed analysis of the textual data from U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases....
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作者：Canales, Rodrigo; Santini, Juan Francisco; Magana, Marina Gonzalez; Cherem, Alexis
作者单位：Boston University; The World Bank
摘要：Research on organizational justice shows that perceptions of justice by internal and external agents are reliable predictors of key organizational outcomes. But how can we promote the enactment of fair behavior by those with decision-making authority within organizations? This is particularly important for organizations that depend on frequent client interactions, in which individual discretion is required to make consequential decisions, and where necessary evils are unavoidable. Few organiza...
