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作者：Dai, Tinglong; Jerath, Kinshuk
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Columbia University
摘要：We study a scenario in which a firm designs the compensation contract for a salesperson who exerts unobservable effort to increase the level of uncertain demand and, jointly, the firm also decides the inventory level to be stocked. We use a newsvendor-type model in which actual sales depend on the realized demand but are limited by the inventory available, and unfulfilled demand cannot be observed. In this setup, under the optimal contract, the agent is paid a bonus for meeting a sales quota. ...
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作者：Gerakos, Joseph J.; Piotroski, Joseph D.; Srinivasan, Suraj
作者单位：University of Chicago; Stanford University; Harvard University
摘要：This paper examines how different types of interactions with U.S. markets by non-U.S. firms are associated 1 with higher levels of CEO pay, greater emphasis on incentive-based compensation, and smaller pay gaps with U.S. firms. Using a sample of CEOs of UK firms and using both broad cross-sectional and narrow event-window tests, we find that capital market relationship in the form of a U.S. exchange listing is related to higher UK CEO pay; however, the effect is similar when UK firms have a li...
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作者：Chioveanu, Ioana; Zhou, Jidong
作者单位：Brunel University; New York University
摘要：This paper proposes a model in which identical sellers of a homogeneous product compete in both prices and price frames (i.e., ways to present price information). Frame choices affect the comparability of price offers and may cause consumer confusion and lower price sensitivity. In equilibrium, firms randomize their frame choices to obfuscate price comparisons and sustain positive profits. The nature of the equilibrium depends on whether frame differentiation or frame complexity is more confus...
