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作者：Biais, Bruno; Bisiere, Christophe; Pouget, Sebastien
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Toulouse School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We experimentally analyze how to design preopening mechanisms facilitating coordination on high equilibrium liquidity and gains from trade. We allow a call auction to be preceded by a preopening or not, preopening orders to be binding or not, and the opening time to be deterministic or random. When the preopening is nonbinding, traders place manipulative orders, reducing the credibility of preplay communication. Random market opening deters manipulation, but also hinders communication by makin...
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作者：Cezar, Asunur; Cavusoglu, Huseyin; Raghunathan, Srinivasan
作者单位：TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：A unique challenge in information security outsourcing is that neither the outsourcing firm nor the managed security service provider (MSSP) perfectly observes the outcome, the occurrence of a security breach, of prevention effort. Detection of security breaches often requires specialized effort. The current practice is to outsource both prevention and detection to the same MSSP. Some security experts have advocated outsourcing prevention and detection to different MSSPs. We show that the form...
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作者：Lim, Noah; Ham, Sung H.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; George Washington University
摘要：Price delegation to the salesforce is a practice widely adopted by firms. This paper examines the relationship between price delegation and managerial profits using a laboratory economics experiment. A novel feature of our experiment is that we study how varying the relationship organization of the sales manager and salesperson to allow for (1) requests by the salesperson for the manager to choose price delegation, and for (2) the manager to award a small bonus after observing the salesperson'...
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作者：Xiong, Hui; Chen, Ying-Ju
作者单位：Huazhong University of Science & Technology; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：In practice, some well-established service providers (sellers) offer one-time experiences or product demonstrations for the services that have been introduced to the market for years. Such activities, labeled as seller-induced learning, not only help the consumers learn more about themselves but also exploit the consumers by elaborating on the consumer heterogeneity. When the seller-induced learning completely resolves the consumers' valuation uncertainty, it can facilitate a more sophisticate...
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作者：Kocabiyikoglu, Ayse; Popescu, Ioana; Stefanescu, Catalina
作者单位：Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University; INSEAD Business School; European School of Management & Technology
摘要：The integration of systems for pricing and revenue management must trade off potential revenue gains against significant practical and technical challenges. This dilemma motivates us to investigate the value of coordinating decisions on prices and capacity allocation in a stylized setting. We propose two pairs of sequential policies for making static decisions-on pricing and revenue management-that differ in their degree of integration (hierarchical versus coordinated) and their pricing inputs...
