-
作者：Ma, Liye; Krishnan, Ramayya; Montgomery, Alan L.
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Carnegie Mellon University; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：Consumers who are close to one another in a social network often make similar purchase decisions. This similarity can result from latent homophily or social influence, as well as common exogenous factors. Latent homophily means consumers who are connected to one another are likely to have similar characteristics and product preferences. Social influence refers to the ability of one consumer to directly influence another consumer's decision based upon their communication. We present an empirica...
-
作者：Overby, Eric; Forman, Chris
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：The law of one price states that if prices for the same or highly similar goods vary across geographic locations by more than the cost of transport, then traders will shift supply and demand to exploit the price differences. However, several frictions prevent traders from doing this, including lack of information about prices and difficulty trading across locations. Electronic commerce has the potential to reduce these frictions by increasing price visibility and lowering transaction costs. We...
-
作者：Levi, Shai; Zhang, Xiao-Jun
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Prior literature finds that long-lasting changes in firms' disclosure policies and information environment affect the cost of equity. Information asymmetry, however, also changes during the fiscal quarter. Firms disclose information periodically, and in between disclosure dates, traders can obtain private information, and adverse-selection risk increases. Such temporary increases in information asymmetry are usually considered to be diversifiable or too small to impact expected stock returns. ...
-
作者：Feng, Qi; Lai, Guoming; Lu, Lauren Xiaoyuan
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We analyze a dynamic bargaining game in which a seller and a buyer negotiate over quantity and payment to trade for a product. Both firms are impatient, and they make alternating offers until an agreement is reached. The buyer is privately informed about his type, which can be high or low: the high type's demand is stochastically larger than the low type's. In the dynamic negotiation process, the seller can screen, whereas the buyer can signal information through their offers, and the buyer ha...
