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作者：Colliard, Jean-Edouard
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：The regulatory use of banks' internal models makes capital requirements more risk sensitive but invites regulatory arbitrage. I develop a framework to study bank regulation with strategic selection of risk models. A bank supervisor can discourage arbitrage by auditing risk models and implements capital ratios less risk sensitive than in the first-best to reduce auditing costs. The optimal capital ratios of a national supervisor can be different from those set by supranational authorities, in w...
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作者：Kuntz, Ludwig; Scholtes, Stefan; Sulz, Sandra
作者单位：University of Cologne; University of Cambridge; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
摘要：Scholars have recently suggested the reorganization of general hospitals into organizationally separate divisions for routine and non-routine services to overcome operational misalignments between the two types of services. We provide empirical evidence for this proposal from a quality perspective, using over 250,000 patient discharge records from 60 German hospitals across 39 high-mortality disease segments, and focusing on in-hospital mortality as outcome. Disentangling the effects of high, ...
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作者：Sun, Tianshu; Gao, Guodong (Gordon); Jin, Ginger Zhe
作者单位：University of Southern California; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：In this paper, we use mobile messaging to leverage recipients' social ties and encourage offline prosocial activities in groups. In particular, we conduct a randomized field experiment with 80,000 blood donors and study how behavioral interventions and economic rewards motivate offline group formation. We find that two commonly used interventions-reminder messages and individual reward-are ineffective in motivating group formation because they do not compensate donors for the cost of bringing ...
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作者：Lambert, Thomas
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
摘要：This paper analyzes the relationship between bank lobbying and supervisory decisions of regulators and documents its moral hazard implications. Exploiting bank-level information on the universe of commercial and savings banks in the United States, I find that regulators are 44.7% less likely to initiate enforcement actions against lobbying banks. This result is robust across measures of lobbying and accounts for endogeneity concerns by employing instrumental variables strategies. In addition, ...
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作者：Kilic, Mete; Shaliastovich, Ivan
作者单位：University of Southern California; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We measure good and bad variance premia that capture risk compensations for the realized variation in positive and negative market returns, respectively. The two variance premium components jointly predict excess returns over the next one and two years with statistically significant positive (negative) coefficients on the good (bad) component. The R(2)s reach about 10% for aggregate equity and portfolio returns and 20% for corporate bond returns. To explain the new empirical evidence, we devel...
