-
作者：Gupta, Vishal
作者单位：University of Southern California
摘要：We propose a Bayesian framework for assessing the relative strengths of data-driven ambiguity sets in distributionally robust optimization (DRO) when the underlying distribution is defined by a finite-dimensional parameter. The key idea is to measure the relative size between a candidate ambiguity set and a specific asymptotically optimal set. As the amount of data grows large, this asymptotically optimal set is the smallest convex ambiguity set that satisfies a novel Bayesian robustness guara...
-
作者：Stamatopoulos, Ioannis; Tzamos, Christos
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We study a model in which a monopoly firm designs the quality profile of its inventory and then dynamically updates its pricing menu for a finite selling horizon to maximize revenue. In a counterfactual scenario, a social planner goes through the same process to maximize total welfare. We show that in both scenarios the problem of dynamically pricing heterogeneous-quality (vertically differentiated) inventories is equivalent to that of dynamically pricing homogeneous-quality inventories, in th...
-
作者：Wong, Tak-Yuen
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai Institute of International Finance & Economics
摘要：I study a continuous-time principal-agent model in which a multitasking agent engages in unobserved risk-taking. Risk-taking creates short-term profits but also increases the chance of large losses. The optimal contract incentivizes excessive risk-taking when the agent has insufficient skin in the game. Moreover, if the low effort is not too value-destroying and the private benefit of shirking is low enough, the principal can eliminate risk-taking by implementing the low effort. However, with ...
-
作者：Zeithammer, Robert
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Several of the auction-driven exchanges that facilitate programmatic buying of internet display advertising have recently introduced soft floors in addition to standard reserve prices (called hard floors in the industry). A soft floor is a bid level below which a winning bidder pays his own bid instead of paying the second-highest bid as in a second-price auction most ad exchanges use by default. This paper characterizes soft floors' revenue-generating potential as a function of the distributi...
-
作者：Lu, Yixin; Gupta, Alok; Ketter, Wolfgang; van Heckd, Eric
作者单位：George Washington University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Cologne; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
摘要：One of the central issues in auction design is how much information should be disclosed to bidders. In this paper, we examine bidder's identity disclosure in sequential business-to-business (B2B) auctions. Specifically, we compare two information disclosure policies, one that publicly discloses winners' identities (the status quo) and an alternative policy that conceals winners' identities. Using a large-scale field experiment in the Dutch flower auction market, we find that concealing winners...
-
作者：Anderson, Shannon W.; Kimball, Amanda
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：Performance measurement systems (PMSs) are used to diagnose and remediate problems, termed the decision-facilitating or feedback role of management control. We examine whether use of PMSs by individual decision makers is associated with better performance. Experimental studies have isolated individual-level effects of feedback on decision quality; however, it is difficult to extend these findings to natural settings. Archival and survey studies offer evidence on the association between the pre...
-
作者：Kessler, Judd B.; Milkman, Katherine L.; Zhang, C. Yiwei
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：What motivates the rich and powerful to exhibit generosity? We explore this important question in a large field experiment. We solicit donations from 32,174 alumni of an Ivy League university, including thousands of rich and powerful alumni. Consistent with past psychology research, we find that the rich and powerful respond dramatically, and differently than others, to being given a sense of agency over the use of donated funds. Gifts from rich and powerful alumni increase by 100%-350% when t...
-
作者：de Vaan, Mathijs; Elbers, Benjamin; DiPrete, Thomas A.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Columbia University
摘要：The disclosure of compensation peer groups is argued to provide shareholders with valuable information that can be used to scrutinize chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. However, research suggests that there are substantial incentives for executives and directors to bias the compensation peer group upward such that the CEO can extract additional rent. We leverage the idea that reciprocated peer nominations are unlikely to be biased to construct counterfactual peer groups that allow us ...
