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作者：Gurvich, Itai; Lariviere, Martin A.; Ozkan, Can
摘要：Customers often resent priority queues even though priorities are often necessary to maximize either social welfare or revenue. Consequently, it is useful to consider the level of social inefficiency introduced when the design of a priority scheme is turned over to a revenue-maximizing firm. In this paper we study how the priority scheme chosen by a revenue-maximizing firm differs from the one a social planner would use. We study a single-server queue with customers who draw their valuations f...
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作者：Arlotto, Alessandro; Frazelle, Andrew E.; Wei, Yehua
作者单位：Duke University; Boston College
摘要：We study the behavior of strategic customers in an open-routing service network with multiple stations. When a customer enters the network, she is free to choose the sequence of stations that she visits, with the objective of minimizing her expected total system time. We propose a two-station game with all customers present at the start of service and deterministic service times, and we find that strategic customers herd, that is, in equilibrium all customers choose the same route. For unobser...
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作者：Casas-Arce, Pablo; Kittsteiner, Thomas; Asis Martinez-Jerez, F.
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; RWTH Aachen University; University of Notre Dame
摘要：After a contract is signed, contracting partners may engage in opportunistic behavior aimed at circumventing the original intention of the agreement governing their business relationship, complying with the letter but not the spirit of the contract. We use an incomplete contracts approach to show that the anticipation and observability of such behavior are typically not enough to prevent it when parties can renegotiate contractual outcomes. This is because contractually specified incentives in...
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作者：Badertscher, Brad A.; Givoly, Dan; Katz, Sharon P.; Lee, Hanna
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; INSEAD Business School; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：A number of studies have examined the effect of public and private ownership on the cost of debt and concluded that the cost of debt of privately owned firms is higher, driven mainly by the poorer information environment in which these firms operate. We extend this strand of research in two ways. First, we identify and empirically establish the mechanisms that bring about a higher cost of debt to privately owned firms-namely, the limited access that these firms have to the equity capital marke...
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作者：Ke, Ruihao; Li, Meng; Ling, Zhejia; Zhang, Yuan
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Iowa State University
摘要：We examine the role of teamwork within the top executive teams in generating management forecasts. Using social connections within the executive team to capture the team's interaction, cooperation, and teamwork, we find that social connections among team members are associated with higher management forecast accuracy, consistent with economic theories that information is dispersed within a firm and with sociology insights that social connections facilitate information sharing. Further analyses...
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作者：Hong, Bryan; Kueng, Lorenz; Yang, Mu-Jeung
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); New York University; Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：Complementarity between performance pay and other organizational design elements has been argued to be one potential explanation for stark differences in the observed productivity gains from performance pay adoption. Using detailed data on internal organization for a nationally representative sample of firms, we empirically test for the existence of complementarity between performance pay incentives and decentralization of decision-making authority for tasks. To address endogeneity concerns, w...
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作者：Joo, Mingyu; Thompson, Michael L.; Allenby, Greg M.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; Procter & Gamble; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：The identification of optimal product and package designs is challenged when attributes and their levels interact. Firms recognize this by testing trial products and designs prior to launch, during which the effects of interactions are revealed. A difficulty in conducting analysis for product design is dealing with the high dimensionality of the design space and the selection of promising product configurations for testing. We propose an experimental criterion for efficiently testing product p...
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作者：Andrei, Daniel; Carlin, Bruce; Hasler, Michael
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Toronto
摘要：We study an economy with incomplete information in which two agents are uncertain and disagree about the length of business cycles. That is, the agents do not question whether the economy is growing or not, but instead continuously estimate how long economic cycles will last-i.e., they learn about the persistence of fundamentals. Learning about persistence generates high and persistent stock return volatility mostly during recessions, but also (to a smaller extent) during economic booms. Disag...
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作者：Chen, Xin; Gao, Xiangyu; Hu, Zhenyu; Wang, Qiong
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Chinese University of Hong Kong; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
摘要：A newsvendor game allows the players to collaborate on inventory pooling and share the resulting total cost. There are several possible ways to allocate the cost. Previous studies have focused on the core of the game. It is known that the core of the newsvendor game is nonempty, and one can use duality theory in stochastic programming to construct an allocation-referred to as the dual-based allocation-belonging to the core. Yet, an allocation that lies in the core does not necessarily guarante...
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作者：Gao, Long; Mishra, Birendra K.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要：Real markets evolve over time. They often exhibit complex behaviors, such as autocorrelation, continuity, and nonstationarity. How do these behaviors affect channel contracting? We study the problem in a bilateral channel where the retailer has private information on evolving market conditions. We characterize the optimal contract under arbitrary market evolution. The central notion is market inertia: it prices retailer's information advantage, dictates price and quantity response over time, a...
