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作者：Brown, James R.; Martinsson, Gustav
作者单位：Iowa State University; Royal Institute of Technology; Swedish House of Finance
摘要：Corporate transparency reduces information asymmetries between firms and capital markets but increases the costs associated with information leakage to competitors. We explore how a country's information environment affects innovation, an activity characterized by high information asymmetries and potentially severe proprietary costs. Studying both long-run cross-country differences in the availability of firm-specific information to corporate outsiders, as well as quasi-experimental shocks to ...
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作者：Charness, Gary; Holder, Patrick
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; The Brattle Group
摘要：We conduct a laboratory experiment in which participants can make donations to real charities. We vary whether the experimenter provides matching funds for any such donations, and whether there is individual or team competition for these matching funds. Our results indicate that providing matching funds for all donations does increase donations from 23% to 33% of the endowment. While individual competition for matching funds had nearly the same effectiveness as matching all donations, by far t...
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作者：Branstetter, Lee G.; Drev, Matej; Kwon, Namho
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper documents the increasing importance of software for successful innovation in manufacturing sectors well beyond the traditional definition of electronics and information technology. Using panel data for 229 publicly listed firms from 18 countries across four manufacturing industries over the period 1981-2005, we find significant variation across firms in the software intensity of their innovative activity. Firms that exhibit a higher level of software intensity generate more patents ...
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作者：Parakhonyak, Alexei; Vikander, Nick
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Copenhagen
摘要：This paper considers a monopolist's product-launch strategy in the presence of network effects, focusing on how to exploit these effects to the maximum possible extent. In our formal framework, the firm sets a price for its product and chooses a sales scheme, which effectively determines how consumers can learn from each other about the product's popularity. Our results on the profitability of different schemes provide insights on a variety of managerial issues that are of practical relevance ...
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作者：Chaturvedi, Aadhaar; Katok, Elena; Beil, Damian R.
作者单位：University of Namur; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We investigate procurement in a setting in which the buyer is bound by sourcing rules. Sourcing rules may limit the minimum and maximum amounts of business that can be awarded to a single supplier or dictate the minimum number of suppliers who are awarded business, thus necessitating split awards. The buyer announces the splits before the auction, and suppliers bid accordingly. We consider two auction formats: the sealed-bid first-price auction, and a version of the open-bid descending-price a...
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作者：Huang, Ni; Burtch, Gordon; Gu, Bin; Hong, Yili; Liang, Chen; Wang, Kanliang; Fu, Dongpu; Yang, Bo
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Renmin University of China; Capital University of Economics & Business; Renmin University of China
摘要：We design a series of online performance feedback interventions that aim to motivate the production of user-generated content (UGC). Drawing on social value orientation (SVO) theory, we develop a novel set of alternative feedback message framings, aligned with cooperation (e.g., your content benefited others), individualism (e.g., your content was of high quality), and competition (e.g., your content was better than others). We hypothesize how gender (a proxy for SVO) moderates response to eac...
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作者：Jiang, Baojun; Yang, Bicheng
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University of British Columbia
摘要：We provide a dynamic, game-theoretic model to examine a firm's quality and pricing decisions for its new experience goods. Early consumers do not observe product quality prior to purchase but can learn it after purchase and share that product-quality information with later consumers-for example, through online reviews. Both the firm's quality decision and its cost efficiency are the firm's private information and not directly observed by the consumer. The early consumers can make a rational in...
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作者：Lu, Yixin; Gupta, Alok; Ketter, Wolfgang; van Heckd, Eric
作者单位：George Washington University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Cologne; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
摘要：One of the central issues in auction design is how much information should be disclosed to bidders. In this paper, we examine bidder's identity disclosure in sequential business-to-business (B2B) auctions. Specifically, we compare two information disclosure policies, one that publicly discloses winners' identities (the status quo) and an alternative policy that conceals winners' identities. Using a large-scale field experiment in the Dutch flower auction market, we find that concealing winners...
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作者：Savva, Nicos; Tezcan, Tolga; Yildiz, Ozlem
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; University of Virginia
摘要：Yardstick competition is a regulatory scheme for local monopolists (e.g., hospitals), where the monopolist's reimbursement is linked to performance relative to other equivalent monopolists. This regulatory scheme is known to provide cost-reduction incentives and serves as the theoretical underpinning behind the hospital prospective reimbursement system used throughout the developed world. This paper uses a game-theoretic queueing model to investigate how yardstick competition performs in servi...
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作者：Sun, Tianshu; Gao, Guodong (Gordon); Jin, Ginger Zhe
作者单位：University of Southern California; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：In this paper, we use mobile messaging to leverage recipients' social ties and encourage offline prosocial activities in groups. In particular, we conduct a randomized field experiment with 80,000 blood donors and study how behavioral interventions and economic rewards motivate offline group formation. We find that two commonly used interventions-reminder messages and individual reward-are ineffective in motivating group formation because they do not compensate donors for the cost of bringing ...
