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作者：Sumida, Mika; Gallego, Guillermo; Rusmevichientong, Paat; Topaloglu, Huseyin; Davis, James
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of Southern California; Uber Technologies, Inc.
摘要：We examine the revenue-utility assortment optimization problem with the goal of finding an assortment that maximizes a linear combination of the expected revenue of the firm and the expected utility of the customer. This criterion captures the trade-off between the firm-centric objective of maximizing the expected revenue and the customer-centric objective of maximizing the expected utility. The customers choose according to the multinomial logit model, and there is a constraint on the offered...
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作者：Csoka, Peter; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
作者单位：Corvinus University Budapest; HUN-REN; HUN-REN Centre for Economic & Regional Studies; Maastricht University
摘要：The most important rule to determine payments in real-life bankruptcy problems is the proportional rule. Many such bankruptcy problems are characterized by network aspects, and the values of the agents' assets are endogenous as they depend on the extent to which claims on other agents can be collected. These network aspects make an axiomatic analysis challenging. This paper is the first to provide an axiomatization of the proportional rule in financial networks. Our main axiom is invariance to...
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作者：Petrova, Maria; Sen, Ananya; Yildirim, Pinar
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; ICREA; New Economic School; Carnegie Mellon University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Political campaigns are among the most sophisticated marketing exercises in the United States. As part of their marketing communication strategy, an increasing number of politicians adopt social media to inform their constituencies. This study documents the returns from adopting a new technology, namely Twitter, for politicians running for Congress by focusing on the change in campaign contributions received. We compare weekly donations received just before and just after a politician opens a ...
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作者：Ranganathan, Aruna; Shivaram, Ranjitha
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Using ethnographic, personnel, and experimental data from an Indian garment factory, this paper investigates whether and how manager gender affects female worker productivity. We find that female managers motivate greater female worker productivity than male managers by engaging in subordinate scut work, the practice of voluntarily getting one's hands dirty to perform subordinates' routine tasks, which increases subordinates' engagement with their work. Our qualitative data help to generate hy...
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作者：Apffelstaedt, Arno; Mechtenberg, Lydia
作者单位：University of Cologne; University of Hamburg
摘要：When preferences are sensitive to context, firms may influence purchase decisions by designing the environment of consumption choices. This paper studies how competitive retailers optimally design their product line if preferences at the store depend on whether the choice set draws consumer attention to the quality or price of a product. Before making a purchase decision, a consumer chooses among retailers without (fully) anticipating that her preferences at the store are malleable. We show th...
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作者：Banker, Rajiv; Liang, Yi; Ramasubbu, Narayan
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：Technical debt refers to the design, development, and implementation shortcuts taken by firms when deploying accounting information systems. Prior system-level studies have shown that such shortcuts decrease the reliability of systems and increase the long-term system maintenance obligations. On the one hand, technical debt may cause system disruptions that impair firm-level performance. On the other hand, incurring technical debt may aid firms to expedite their systems deployment and to imple...
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作者：Benade, Gerdus; Nath, Swaprava; Procaccia, Ariel D.; Shah, Nisarg
作者单位：Boston University; Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Kanpur; Harvard University; University of Toronto
摘要：Participatory budgeting enables the allocation of public funds by collecting and aggregating individual preferences. It has already had a sizable real-world impact, but making the most of this new paradigm requires rethinking some of the basics of computational social choice, including the very way in which individuals express their preferences. We attempt to maximize social welfare by using observed votes as proxies for voters' unknown underlying utilities, and analytically compare four prefe...
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作者：Calmon, Andre P.; Ciocan, Florin D.; Romero, Gonzalo
作者单位：INSEAD Business School; University of Toronto
摘要：Motivated by online advertising, we model and analyze a revenue management problem where a platform interacts with a set of customers over a number of periods. Unlike traditional network revenue management, which treats the interaction between platform and customers as one-shot, we consider stateful customers who can dynamically change their goodwill toward the platform depending on the quality of their past interactions. Customer goodwill further determines the amount of budget that they allo...
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作者：Hu, Ming; Wang, Lu
作者单位：University of Toronto; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：In a crowdsourcing contest, innovation is outsourced by a firm to an open crowd that competes in generating innovative solutions. Given that the projects typically consist of multiple attributes, how should the firm optimally design a crowdsourcing contest for such a project? We consider two alternative mechanisms. One is a joint contest, where the best solution is chosen from the joint solutions across attributes submitted by all contestants. The other ismultiple separate parallel subcontests...
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作者：Baiman, Stanley; Heinle, Mirko S.; Saouma, Richard
作者单位：European School of Management & Technology; University of Pennsylvania; Michigan State University; Michigan State University's Broad College of Business
摘要：The literature on resource allocation under adverse selection has focused on models in which the resource being allocated is such that the privately informed agent always prefers more of it to less. We analyze a firm's optimal resource allocation mechanism when this assumption does not hold and show that the resulting mechanism has a number of novel characteristics. For example, first best may be achievable even with nontrivial information asymmetry; when first best cannot be achieved, it is a...
