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作者：Besanko, David; Doraszelski, Ulrich; Lu, Lauren Xiaoyuan; Satterthwaite, Mark
作者单位：Northwestern University; Harvard University; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：Capacity addition and withdrawal decisions are among the most important strategic decisions made by firms in oligopolistic industries. In this paper, we develop and analyze a fully dynamic model of an oligopolistic industry with lumpy capacity and lumpy investment/disinvestment. We use our model to suggest answers to two questions: First, what economic factors facilitate preemption races? Second, what economic factors facilitate capacity coordination? With a series of examples we show that low...
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作者：Downward, A.; Zakeri, G.; Philpottt, A. B.
作者单位：University of Auckland
摘要：We consider electricity pool markets in radial transmission networks in which the lines have capacities. At each node there is a strategic generator injecting generation quantities into the pool. Prices are determined by a linear competitive fringe at each node (or equivalently a linear demand function) through a convex dispatch optimization. We derive a set of linear inequalities satisfied by the line capacities that gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the unconstrained one-shot Cou...
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作者：Pritchard, Geoffrey; Zakeri, Golbon; Philpott, Andrew
作者单位：University of Auckland; University of Auckland
摘要：We discuss a stochastic-programming-based method for scheduling electric power generation subject to uncertainty. Such uncertainty may arise from either imperfect forecasting or moment-to-moment fluctuations, and on either the supply or the demand side. The method gives a system of locational marginal prices that reflect the uncertainty, and these may be used in a market settlement scheme in which payment is for energy only. We show that this scheme is revenue adequate in expectation.
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作者：Ben-Tal, Aharon; Bertsimas, Dimitris; Brown, David B.
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Duke University
摘要：In this paper, we propose a framework for robust optimization that relaxes the standard notion of robustness by allowing the decision maker to vary the protection level in a smooth way across the uncertainty set. We apply our approach to the problem of maximizing the expected value of a payoff function when the underlying distribution is ambiguous and therefore robustness is relevant. Our primary objective is to develop this framework and relate it to the standard notion of robustness, which d...
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作者：Sobel, Matthew J.; Wei, Wei
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University
摘要：An optimum of a Markov decision process (MDP) is myopic if it can be obtained by solving a series of static problems. Myopic optima are desirable because they can be computed relatively easily. We identify new classes of MDPs with myopic optima and sequential games with myopic equilibrium points. In one of the classes, the single-period reward is homogeneous with respect to the state variable. We illustrate the results with models of revenue management and investment.
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作者：Weintraub, Gabriel Y.; Benkard, C. Lanier; Van Roy, Benjamin
作者单位：Columbia University; Yale University; Stanford University
摘要：Oblivious equilibrium is a new solution concept for approximating Markov-perfect equilibrium in dynamic models of imperfect competition among heterogeneous firms. In this paper, we present algorithms for computing oblivious equilibrium and for bounding approximation error. We report results from computational case studies that serve to assess both efficiency of the algorithms and accuracy of oblivious equilibrium as an approximation to Markov-perfect equilibrium. We also extend the definition ...
