-
作者：Kumar, Subodha; Mookerjee, Vijay S.
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
-
作者：Santamaria, Natalia
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：In procurement auctions, the object for sale is a contract, bidders are suppliers, and the bid taker is a buyer. The suppliers bidding for the contract are usually the current supplier (the incumbent) and a group of potential new suppliers (the entrants). As the buyer has an ongoing relationship with the incumbent, he needs to adjust the bids of the entrants to include non-price attributes, such as the switching costs. The buyer can run a scoring auction, in which suppliers compete on the adju...
-
作者：Guenes, Evrim Didem; Oermeci, E. Lerzan; Kunduzcu, Derya
-
作者：Esenduran, Goekce; Kemahlioglu-Ziya, Eda
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; North Carolina State University
摘要：Product take-back regulation, under which firms finance the collection and treatment of their end-of-life products, is a widely used environmental program. One of the most common compliance schemes is collectively with cost allocation by market share. As an alternative, individual compliance scheme is considered. Assuming that firms can choose their compliance scheme, we compare these two schemes with respect to the costs they impose on firms and environmental benefits. We show that high colle...
