3期

最新文章

• Agile contracting: Managing incentives under uncertain needs AI翻译
  作者：Gupta, Shivam; Agrawal, Anupam; Ryan, Jennifer K. K.
  作者单位：University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln; Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Udaipur (IIMU)
  摘要：We consider a novel principal-agent model that captures some salient features of an agile software development project. Specifically, the project is technically complex, can be modularized via a set of independent stories which are developed in sprints, and has requirements that can change over time due to exogenous changes in business needs, technologies, or market conditions. In addition, given the iterative nature of agile development, our model also captures and analyzes the interaction be...
• Real-time delay announcement under competition AI翻译
  作者：Singh, Siddharth Prakash; Delasay, Mohammad; Scheller-Wolf, Alan
  作者单位：University of London; University College London; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Carnegie Mellon University
  摘要：Internet-based technology enables firms to disseminate real-time delay information to delay-sensitive customers. We study how such delay announcements impact service providers in a competitive environment with two service providers who compete for market share. We model the service providers' strategies based on an endogenous timing game, investigating strategies that emerge in equilibrium. We determine the service providers' market shares under the various game outcomes by analyzing continuou...
• Redundancy allocation under state-dependent distributional uncertainty of component lifetimes AI翻译
  作者：Li, Jun; Huang, Yizhe; Li, Yan-Fu; Wang, Shuming
  作者单位：Chinese Academy of Sciences; University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, CAS; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Tsinghua University
  摘要：In this paper, we consider a redundancy allocation problem in a series-parallel system with uncertain component lifetimes of multiple states, which involves multitype components and mixed redundancy strategy. We develop a distributionally robust redundancy allocation model using state-dependent ambiguity set, which describes the mean, expected cross-deviation, and the support conditional on each state of the component lifetime distribution. Our structural analysis of the worst-case system reli...
• Gaining by ceding - bounded wholesale pricing for information sharing in a supply chain AI翻译
  作者：Li, Tian; Zhang, Hongtao
  作者单位：East China University of Science & Technology; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; East China University of Science & Technology
  摘要：The extant research on supply chain information sharing under wholesale pricing often assumes a model where the manufacturer can unilaterally set any wholesale price, and the retailer decides retail quantity or price while taking the wholesale price as given. Whereas this model may actually reflect the relative market power in some situations, its implementation misses out on certain win-win opportunities that could arise from information sharing. We propose a new wholesale pricing mechanism t...
• Value of information with manufacturer encroachment AI翻译
  作者：Guan, Huiqi; Yang (Ben), Zhibin; Gurnani, Haresh
  作者单位：Fudan University; University of Oregon; Wake Forest University; Wake Forest University
  摘要：We study the value of information in a supply chain where the manufacturer introduces a direct-selling channel to encroach in the retailer's market. Based on different information structures regarding the direct-selling cost for the manufacturer, we analyze three models: incomplete information model, asymmetric information model, and full information model. By comparing the firms' profits in these models, we derive the value of the manufacturer's information acquisition and the value of sharin...
• Developing a shared supplier with endogenous spillovers AI翻译
  作者：Veldman, Jasper; Anderson, Edward; Pulles, Niels J.; Gaalman, Gerard
  作者单位：University of Groningen; University of Sydney; Imperial College London; University of Twente; University of Groningen
  摘要：Firms who buy from suppliers often engage in supplier development to reduce the supplier's production cost. Being aware that their efforts may benefit a rival firm when there is a shared supplier, some buyers only invest in specific supplier development, that is, in those processes or technologies where spillover cannot occur. Other buyers willingly accept the spillover that arises from supplier development, and invest in generic supplier development. Our game-theoretic model captures a buyer'...