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作者：Bohren, O; Eckbo, BE; Michalsen, D
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; BI Norwegian Business School; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：We examine rights issues on the Oslo Stock Exchange, where seasoned public offerings now take place almost exclusively through use of the relatively expensive standby underwriting method rather than unsinsured rights. We show that the propensity to use standby underwriting increases as expected shareholder takeup decreases, that the market reaction to uninsured rights offers is significantly positive, and that standbys elicit the least favorable market reaction to the public issue announcement...
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作者：Chan, SH; Kensinger, JW; Keown, AJ; Martin, JD
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; University of North Texas System; University of North Texas Denton; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We investigate share price responses to the formation of 345 strategic alliances spanning 1983-1992. The average stock price response is positive, with no evidence of wealth transfers. This is true for horizontal alliances (involving partner firms in industries with the same three-digit SIC codes) as well as non-horizontal alliances. For horizontal alliances, more value accrues when the alliance involves the transfer or pooling of technical knowledge than with nontechnical alliances. Finally, ...
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作者：Mikkelson, WH; Partch, MM
摘要：We compare top management turnover in unacquired U.S. industrial companies during an active takeover market (1984-1988) and a less active takeover market (1989-1993). For firms in the lowest quartile of performance (measured by operating income scaled by assets), 33% experience complete turnover of the president, CEO, and board chair during the active takeover period and only 17% experience complete turnover during the less active period. Controlling for various determinants of management turn...
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作者：Damodaran, A; John, K; Liu, CH
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We study changes in the real estate industry among organizational forms with varying degrees of restrictiveness and document the associated changes in profitability, free cash flow, debt, dividends, and investment policies. All troubled firms in our sample move to a more flexibile organizational structure, with subsequent reductions in dividends, improvements in performance, and increases in asset sales and investments. Healthy firms that move to a tighter structure have larger free cash flows...
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作者：Loderer, C; Martin, K
作者单位：New Mexico State University
摘要：We examine the relation between managers' financial interests and firm performance. Since the relation could go in either direction, we cast the analysis in a simultaneous equations framework. For firms involved in acquisitions, we find that acquisition performance and Tobin's Q ratios affect the size of managers stockholdings. We find no evidence, however, that larger stockholdings lead to better performance. Perhaps management is effectively disciplined by competition in product and labor ma...
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作者：Rosenstein, S; Wyatt, JG
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Miami University
摘要：We investigate whether inside managers are added to corporate boards for efficiency or entrenchment purposes. Our examination of inside director appointments finds that the stock-market reaction to the announcement is significantly negative when inside directors own less than 5% of the firm's common stock, significantly positive when their ownership level is between 5% and 25%, and insignificantly different from zero when ownership exceeds 25%. These results suggest that the expected benefits ...
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作者：Fama, EF; French, KR
作者单位：Yale University; University of Chicago
摘要：Estimates of the cost of equity for industries are imprecise. Standard errors of more than 3.0% per year are typical for both the CAPM and the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993). These large standard errors are the result of(i) uncertainty about true factor risk premiums and (ii) imprecise estimates of the loadings of industries on the risk factors. Estimates of the cost of equity for firms and projects are surely even less precise.
