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作者：Jin, L
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：This paper examines the relation between chief executive officers' (CEOs') incentive levels and their firms' risk characteristics. I show theoretically that, when CEOs cannot trade the market portfolio, optimal incentive level decreases with firm's nonsystematic risk but is ambiguously affected by firm's systematic risk; when CEOs can trade the market portfolio, optimal incentive level decreases with nonsystematic risk but is unaffected by systematic risk. Empirically I find support for these ...
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作者：Busse, JA; Green, TC
作者单位：Emory University
摘要：The Morning Call and Midday Call segments on CNBC TV provide a unique opportunity to study the efficient market hypothesis. The segments report analysts' views about individual stocks and are broadcast when the market is open. We find that prices respond to reports within seconds of initial mention, with positive reports fully incorporated within one minute. Trading intensity doubles in the first minute, with a significant increase in buyer- (seller-) initiated trades after positive (negative)...
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作者：Bae, KH; Kang, JK; Lim, CW
作者单位：Michigan State University; Michigan State University's Broad College of Business; Korea University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：Using a large sample of exogenous events that negatively affected Korean banks during the 1997-98 period, we examine the value of durable bank relationships in Korea. We show that adverse shocks to banks have a negative effect not only on the value of the banks themselves but also on the value of their client firms, and that this adverse effect on firm value is a decreasing function of the financial health of both the banks and their client firms. Our results are concentrated in the second hal...
