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作者：Fos, Vyacheslav; Tsoutsoura, Margarita
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Chicago
摘要：This paper shows that proxy contests have a significant adverse effect on careers of incumbent directors. Following a proxy contest, directors experience a significant decline in the number of directorships not only in the targeted company, but also in other nontargeted companies. The results are established using the universe of all proxy contests during 1996-2010. To isolate the effect of the proxy contest, our empirical strategy uses within-firm variation in directors' exposure to the possi...
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作者：Jacobsen, Stacey
作者单位：Southern Methodist University
摘要：To examine the market response to positive revelations of chief executive officer (CEO) quality, this study focuses on CEOs who withdraw acquisition bids when the price becomes increasingly expensive. Firms that withdrawal for price-related reasons earn higher withdrawal returns than firms that withdraw for other reasons. This relation is stronger when CEO uncertainty and discretion is high. CEOs unwilling to increase the offer price are less likely to be replaced and more likely to advance to...
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作者：Chan, Kalok; Chan, Yue-Cheong
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Hong Kong Polytechnic University
摘要：We investigate what stock return synchronicity reflects in terms of price informativeness by examining its effect on the pricing of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Based on 5,087 SEOs from 1984 to 2007, we find a significantly negative relation between stock return synchronicity (estimated as the logit transformation of the R-squared statistic from a two-factor regression) and SEO discounts (the percentage differences between pre-offer day closing prices and offer prices). The negative relat...
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作者：Custodio, Claudia; Metzger, Daniel
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Downtown Phoenix; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We study CEOs with a career background in finance. Firms with financial expert CEOs hold less cash, more debt, and engage in more share repurchases. Financial expert CEOs are more financially sophisticated: they are less likely to use one companywide discount rate instead of a project-specific one, they manage financial policies more actively, and their firm investments are less sensitive to cash flows. Financial expert CEOs are able to raise external funds even when credit conditions are tigh...
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作者：Osili, Una Okonkwo; Paulson, Anna
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University in Indianapolis; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：We show that individuals who have experienced a systemic banking crisis are 11 percentage points less likely to use banks in the U.S. than otherwise similar individuals who emigrated from the same country but did not live through a crisis. This finding is robust to controlling for exposure to other macroeconomic events and to various methods for addressing potential bias due to migrant self-selection. Consistent with the view that personal experience plays an important role in decision-making,...
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作者：Jorion, Philippe; Schwarz, Christopher
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：A discontinuity, or kink, at zero in the hedge fund net return distribution has been interpreted as evidence of managers manipulating returns to avoid showing small losses. Instead, we propose alternative explanations for this phenomenon. In particular, we show that incentive fees can mechanistically create a kink in the net return distribution. This mechanism accounts for almost the entire kink observed in the large, liquid Long-Short Equity style. Furthermore, we show that asset illiquidity ...
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作者：Jankowitsch, Rainer; Nagler, Florian; Subrahmanyam, Marti G.
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business; New York University
摘要：We examine recovery rates of defaulted bonds in the US corporate bond market, based on a complete set of traded prices and volumes. A study of the trading microstructure around various types of default events is provided. We document temporary price pressure with high trading volumes on the default day and the following 30 days, and low trading activity thereafter. Based on this analysis, we determine market-based recovery rates and quantify various liquidity measures. We study the relation be...
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作者：Belot, Francois; Ginglinger, Edith; Sloyin, Myron B.; Sushka, Marie E.
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：We examine board structure in France, which since 1966 has allowed firms the freedom to choose between unitary and two-tier boards. We analyze how this choice relates to characteristics of the firm and its environment. Firms with severe asymmetric information tend to opt for unitary boards; firms with a potential for private benefits extraction tend to adopt two-tier boards. Chief executive officer turnover is more sensitive to performance at firms with two-tier boards, indicating greater moni...
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作者：Banerjee, Snehal; Graveline, Jeremy J.
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：Regulatory restrictions and market frictions can constrain the aggregate quantity of long and short positions in a security. When these constraints bind, we refer to the security as scarce, and its price becomes distorted relative to its value in a frictionless market. We show that an otherwise redundant derivative can reduce the price distortion of the underlying security by relaxing its scarcity. We also show that it is especially important to analyze the underlying and derivative markets jo...
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作者：Armstrong, Christopher S.; Core, John E.; Guay, Wayne R.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Although recent research documents a positive relation between corporate transparency and the proportion of independent directors, the direction of causality is unclear. We examine a regulatory shock that substantially increased board independence for some firms, and find that information asymmetry, and to some extent management disclosure and financial intermediation, changed at firms affected by this shock. We also examine whether these effects vary as a function of management entrenchment, ...
