作者：Gryglewicz, Sebastian; Mayer, Simon; Morellec, Erwan
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne
摘要：We build a dynamic agency model in which the agent controls both current earnings via short-term investment and firm growth via long-term investment. Under the optimal contract, agency conflicts can induce short- and long-term investment levels beyond first best, leading to short- or long-termism in corporate policies. The paper analytically shows how firm characteristics shape the optimal contract and the horizon of corporate policies, thereby generating a number of novel empirical prediction...
作者：Chernenko, Sergey; Sunderam, Adi
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University
摘要：We develop three novel measures of the incentives of equity mutual funds to internalize the price impact of their trading. We show that mutual funds with stronger incentives to internalize their price impact accommodate inflows and outflows by adjusting their cash buffers instead of trading in portfolio securities. As a result, stocks held by these funds have lower volatility, and flows out of these funds have smaller spillover effects on other funds holding the same securities. Our results pr...
