-
作者：Berg, Tobias
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper studies the dual role of risk managers and loan officers in a bank's organizational structure. Using 75,000 retail mortgage applications, I analyze the effect of risk-management involvement on loan default rates. The bank requires risk-management approval for loans that are considered risky based on hard information, using a sharp threshold that changes during the sample period. Using a regression discontinuity design and a difference-in-differences estimator, I am able to show that...
-
作者：Brav, Alon; Jiang, Wei; Kim, Hyunseob
作者单位：Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University; Cornell University
摘要：This paper studies the long-term effect of hedge fund activism on firm productivity using plant-level information from the U.S. Census Bureau. A typical target firm improves production efficiency in the 3 years after intervention, with stronger improvements in business strategy-oriented interventions. Plants sold after intervention improve productivity significantly under new ownership, suggesting that capital redeployment is an important channel for value creation. Employees of target firms e...
-
作者：Fishman, Michael J.; Parker, Jonathan A.
作者单位：Northwestern University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study a market for funding real investment where valuation-meaning investors devoting resources to acquiring information about future payoffs-creates an adverse selection problem. Unlike previous models, more valuation is associated with lower market prices and so greater returns to valuation. This strategic complementarity in the capacity to do valuation generates multiple equilibria. With multiple equilibria, the equilibrium without valuation is most efficient despite funding some unprofi...
-
作者：Hugonnier, Julien; Malamud, Semyon; Morellec, Erwan
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI)
摘要：We develop a dynamic model of investment, financing, and cash management decisions in which investment is lumpy and firms face capital supply uncertainty. We characterize optimal policies explicitly, demonstrate that smooth-pasting conditions may not guarantee optimality, and show that firms may not follow standard single barrier policies. In the model, firms with high investment costs differ in their behaviors from firms with low investment costs, financing policy does not follow a strict pec...
-
作者：Bai, Jennie; Collin-Dufresne, Pierre; Goldstein, Robert S.; Helwege, Jean
作者单位：Georgetown University; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要：Reduced-form models of default that attribute a large fraction of credit spreads to compensation for credit-event risk typically preclude the most plausible economic justification for such risk to be priced, namely, a contemporaneous drop in the market portfolio. When this contagion channel is introduced within a general equilibrium framework for an economy comprising a large number of firms, credit-event risk premia have an upper bound of a few basis points, and are dwarfed by the contagion p...
-
作者：Iliev, Peter; Lins, Karl V.; Miller, Darius P.; Roth, Lukas
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Southern Methodist University; University of Alberta
摘要：Using a sample of non-U.S. firms from 43 countries, we investigate whether laws and regulations as well as votes cast by U.S. institutional investors are consistent with an effective shareholder voting process. We find that laws and regulations allow for meaningful votes to be cast, as shareholder voting is both mandatory and binding for important elections. For votes cast, we find there is greater dissent voting when investors fear expropriation. Further, greater dissent voting is associated ...
-
作者：Denis, David J.; Denis, Diane K.; Walker, Mark D.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; North Carolina State University
摘要：Following corporate spinoffs, unit boards are formed from scratch. We find that these de novo boards are smaller, more independent, include more outside directors with relevant industry expertise, and derive more industry expertise from outsiders than do industry- and size-matched peers. These differences are observed only when the unit CEO was not the CEO or a director of the pre-spinoff parent firm-that is, when there is a greater need to assess the CEO's ability and match with the firm. We ...
-
作者：Akey, Pat
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：This paper investigates the value of firm political connections using a regression discontinuity design in a sample of close, off-cycle U.S. congressional elections. I compare firms donating to winning candidates and firms donating to losing candidates and find that postelection abnormal equity returns are 3% higher for firms donating to winning candidates. Connections to politicians serving on powerful congressional committees, such as appropriations and taxation, are especially valuable and ...
-
作者：van Kervel, Vincent
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
摘要：The rise of computerized trading strategies in equity markets has spurred competition between trading venues. This paper shows that cross-venue strategies create highly interlinked markets: trades on one venue are followed by sizeable cancellations of limit orders on competing venues. These cancellations are explained in a simple model of competition between two limit order markets with fast and slow traders. Only the fast traders can access the liquidity of both venues simultaneously. Empiric...
-
作者：Kang, Ari; Lowery, Richard; Wardlaw, Malcolm
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We estimate a dynamic model of the decision to close a troubled bank. Regulators trade off an aversion to closing banks against the risk that allowing a bank to continue will raise the eventual costs to the deposit insurance fund. Using a conditional choice probability approach, we estimate the costs associated with closing banks, both in direct costs to the insurance fund and in other costs perceived by regulators, either social or personal. We find that delayed closures were driven by a desi...
