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作者：Chowdhry, Bhagwan; Davies, Shaun William; Waters, Brian
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：We study joint financing between profit-motivated and socially motivated (impact) investors and derive conditions under which impact investments improve social outcomes. When project owners cannot commit to social objectives, impact investors hold financial claims to counterbalance owners' tendencies to overemphasize profits. Impact investors' ownership stakes are higher when the value of social output is higher, and pure nonprofit status may be optimal for the highest valued social projects. ...
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作者：Cheng, Ing-Haw
作者单位：Dartmouth College
摘要：Ex ante estimates of the volatility premium embedded in VIX futures, known as the VIX premium, fall or stay flat when ex ante measures of risk rise. This is not an artifact of mismeasurement: (i) ex ante premiums reliably predict ex post returns to VIX futures with a coefficient near one, and (ii) falling ex ante premiums predict increasing ex post market and investment risk, creating profitable trading opportunities. Falling hedging demand helps explain this behavior, as premiums and trader e...
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作者：Foa, Gabriele; Gambacorta, Leonardo; Guiso, Luigi; Mistrulli, Paolo Emilio
作者单位：Bank for International Settlements (BIS); European Central Bank; Bank of Italy
摘要：Using matched borrower-lender data, we document strong nonprice supplier effects in mortgage contract choice. For given relative price of adjustable and fixed rate mortgages, households borrowing from banks hit by shocks to the cost of long term funding, or to the deposits base or to access to securitization are more likely to choose adjustable rate mortgages. Supply factors have larger effects on less-sophisticated households and at times of price inaction. A model in which banks affect borro...
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作者：Bharath, Sreedhar T.; Hertzel, Michael
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：This paper examines how external governance pressure affects the type of debt that firms issue. Consistent with a governance mechanism substitution effect, we find that an exogenous increase (decrease) in governance pressure from the product (takeover) market has a significant negative (positive) impact on the use of bank (public debt) financing over public debt (bank loan) issuance. Tests using changes in the strictness of loan covenants provide corroborative evidence. These findings are cons...
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作者：Edmans, Alex; Levit, Doron; Reilly, Devin
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute; Analysis Group Inc.
摘要：Conventional wisdom is that diversification weakens governance by spreading investors too thinly. We show that, when investors own multiple firms (common ownership), governance through both voice and exit can strengthen-even if the firms are in unrelated industries. Under common ownership, informed investors have flexibility over which assets to sell upon a liquidity shock. They sell low-quality firms first, thereby increasing price informativeness. In a voice model, investors' incentives to m...
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作者：Hanson, Samuel G.; Scharfstein, David S.; Sunderam, Adi
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We develop a model of government portfolio choice in which the government chooses the scale of risky projects in the presence of market failures and tax distortions. These frictions motivate the government to manage social risk and fiscal risk. Social risk management favors programs that ameliorate market failures in bad times. Fiscal risk management makes unattractive programs involving large government outlays when other government programs also require large outlays. These two risk manageme...
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作者：Busse, Jeffrey A.; Tong, Lin; Tong, Qing; Zhang, Zhe
作者单位：Emory University; Fordham University; Renmin University of China; Singapore Management University
摘要：We construct a new measure of trading regularity, capturing the extent to which investors trade on a regular basis. Institutional investors that regularly trade outperform those that trade less regularly. The performance of funds that regularly trade persists for at least a year. Among those who trade most regularly, larger funds perform relatively worse, because they incur higher transaction costs associated with their larger trades. Institutions that regularly trade generate superior perform...
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作者：Basak, Suleyman; Chabakauri, Georgy; Yavuz, M. Deniz
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：Empirical evidence suggests that investor protection significantly affects ownership concentration and asset prices. We develop a dynamic asset pricing model to address the empirical regularities and uncover some of the underlying mechanisms at play. Our model features a controlling shareholder that endogenously accumulates control over a firm, and diverts a fraction of its output. Better investor protection decreases stock holdings of controlling shareholders, increases stock mean returns, an...
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作者：Hadlock, Charles J.; Schwartz-Ziv, Miriam
作者单位：Michigan State University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We study blockholder presence in a large panel and document substantial heterogeneity in holding periods, position sizes, and positions taken across blockholder types. Nonfinancial blocks are more likely to be observed in smaller, riskier, younger, and less-liquid firms. These patterns are either not evident or reversed for financial blocks. For all but small financial blocks, we detect significant negative interdependence in blockholder investment decisions, with the presence of one blockhold...
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作者：Agarwal, Vikas; Zhao, Haibei
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; Lehigh University
摘要：The Investment Company Act of 1940 restricts interfund lending and borrowing within a mutual fund family, but families can apply for regulatory exemptions to participate in such transactions. We find that the monitoring mechanisms and investment restrictions influence the family's decision to apply for the interfund lending programs. We document several benefits of such programs for equity funds. First, participating funds reduce cash holdings and increase investments in illiquid assets. Secon...
