作者：Alok, Shashwat; Ayyagari, Meghana
作者单位：Indian School of Business (ISB); George Washington University
摘要：We document apolitical cycle in the investment decisions of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by using the constitutionally mandated election schedule in India as a source of exogenous variation in politicians' incentive to cater to voters. Using a project-level investment database, we find that SOEs announce more capital expenditure projects in election years, especially in infrastructure, and in districts with close elections, high-ranking politicians, and left-wing incumbents. SOE projects in ...
作者：Denis, Diane K.; Jochem, Torsten; Rajamani, Anjana
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Amsterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
摘要：We document that firms whose compensation peers experience weak say on pay votes reduce CEO compensation following those votes. Reductions reflect proxy adviser concerns about peers' compensation contracts and are stronger when CEOs receive excess compensation, when they compete more closely with their weak-vote peers in the executive labor market, and when those peers perform well. Reductions occur following peers' disclosures of revised pay and are proportional to those needed to retain firm...
