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作者：Acharya, Viral V.; Parlatore, Cecilia; Sundaresan, Suresh
作者单位：New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; European Corporate Governance Institute; Columbia University
摘要：We examine the optimal financing of infrastructure when governments can expropriate rents from private sector firms that manage infrastructure. While private firms need incentives to implement projects well, governments need incentives to limit expropriation. This double moral hazard limits the willingness of outside investors to fund infrastructure projects. Optimal financing contracts involve government guarantees to investors against project failure to incentivize the government to agree no...
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作者：Beaumont, Paul; Hebert, Camille; Lyonnet, Victor
作者单位：McGill University; University of Toronto
摘要：Firms enter new sectors by either building on their resources or buying existing companies. Using French administrative data, we propose a measure of human capital distance between a firm and a sector of entry. Using a shift-share instrument, we show that firms build in close sectors and buy in distant sectors in terms of human capital distance. Firms build by hiring new workers, which becomes increasingly costly in distant sectors as it requires not only hiring more workers but also having mo...
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作者：Colliard, Jean-Edouard; Foucault, Thierry; Lovo, Stefano
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We study Algorithmic Market Makers (AMs) that use Q-learning algorithms to set prices for a risky asset. We find that while AMs successfully adapt to adverse selection, they struggle to learn competitive pricing strategies. This failure is driven by limited experimentation and noisy feedback regarding the profitability of undercutting a competitor. Consequently, an increase in AMs' profit volatility tends to result in less competitive market outcomes. These features leave identifiable patterns...
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作者：Kogan, Leonid; Mitra, Indrajit
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta
摘要：We propose a general simulation-based procedure for estimating the quality of approximate policies in heterogeneous-agent equilibrium models, which allows us to verify that such approximate solutions describe a near-rational equilibrium. Our procedure endows agents with superior knowledge of the future path of the economy, while imposing a suitable penalty for such foresight. The relaxed problem is more tractable than the original, and results in an upper bound on agents' welfare. Our method a...
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作者：Fang, Xiang; Hardy, Bryan; Lewis, Karen K.
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; Bank for International Settlements (BIS); University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper studies whether investor composition affects the sovereign debt market. We construct a data set of sovereign debt holdings by foreign and domestic bank, nonbank private and official investors for 101 countries across three decades. Compared with other investors, private nonbank investors absorb a disproportionate share of the debt supply, and their demand for emerging market debt is most price responsive. A counterfactual analysis of emerging market sovereigns shows a 10% increase i...
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作者：Heeb, Florian; Kolbel, Julian F.; Ramelli, Stefano; Vasileva, Anna
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of St Gallen; University of St Gallen; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); University of Zurich
摘要：A fundamental concern about green investing is that it may crowd out political support for public policies addressing negative externalities. We examine this concern in a preregistered experiment conducted shortly before a real referendum on a climate law in Switzerland. We find that offering an opportunity to invest in a climate-friendly fund does not reduce individual support for climate regulation, measured by political donations and voting intentions. A replication of the experiment in the...
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作者：Gomes, Francisco; Haliassos, Michael; Ramadorai, Tarun
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Goethe University Frankfurt; University of London; Imperial College London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We present and discuss the papers in this special issue. We use the themes that these papers study to illustrate interesting new directions that are being pursued in the household finance literature and highlight open questions on which more work is needed.
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作者：Gormley, Todd A.; Kaviani, Mahsa; Maleki, Hosein, I
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University of Delaware; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：We document that judges' political affiliations are strongly associated with the level of judicial penalties levied against companies. For example, Republican-appointed judges impose larger fines for hiring illegal immigrants, while Democrat-appointed judges impose larger fines for pollution- and environment-related violations. Time-series variation suggests that political partisanship, not fixed ideological differences, drives these findings. The differences become amplified when higher-court...
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作者：Bretscher, Lorenzo; Schmid, Lukas; Sen, Ishita; Sharma, Varun
作者单位：University of Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Southern California; Harvard University; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：We propose an equilibrium corporate bond pricing model that accommodates the heterogeneity in institutional investors' preferences and mandates in an empirically tractable way. Our model, estimated on rich holdings data, quantifies investors' preferences and demand elasticities, with inelastic insurers focusing on the investment-grade segment, and elastic mutual funds substituting across ratings groups. The model offers a novel quantitative perspective of the effect of recent trends in institu...
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作者：Moussawi, Rabih; Shen, Ke; Velthuis, Raisa
作者单位：Villanova University; University of Pennsylvania; Lehigh University
摘要：This paper argues that a lesser known yet economically significant tax-deferral feature of ETFs' security design is crucial to their success. By relying on the in-kind redemption exemption, authorized participants help ETFs avoid distributing capital gains and reduce their tax overhang, partly by deploying heartbeat trades. We estimate that the ETF tax efficiency has increased long-term investors' after-tax returns by 1.05% per year relative to mutual funds in recent years. Exploiting cross-se...
