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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Golosov, Michael; Tsyvinski, Aleh
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University
摘要：We study the provision of dynamic incentives to self-interested politicians who control the allocation of resources in the context of the standard neoclassical growth model. Citizens discipline politicians using elections. We show that the need to provide incentives to the politician in power creates political economy distortions in the structure of production, which resemble aggregate tax distortions. We provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in ...
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作者：Weintraub, Gabriel Y.; Benkard, C. Lanier; Van Roy, Benjamin
作者单位：Columbia University; Stanford University; Stanford University
摘要：We propose an approximation method for analyzing Ericson and Pakes (1995)-style dynamic models of imperfect competition. We define a new equilibrium concept that we call oblivious equilibrium, in which each firm is assumed to make decisions based only on its own state and knowledge of the long-run average industry state, but where firms ignore current information about competitors' states. The great advantage of oblivious equilibria is that they are much easier to compute than are Markov perfe...
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作者：Hurvich, Clifford M.; Moulines, Eric; Soulier, Philippe
作者单位：New York University; IMT - Institut Mines-Telecom; IMT Atlantique; Universite Paris Nanterre
