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作者：Klibanoff, Peter; Mukerji, Sujoy; Seo, Kyoungwon
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Oxford; Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST)
摘要：We axiomatize preferences that can be represented by a monotonic aggregation of subjective expected utilities generated by a utility function and some set of i.i.d. probability measures over a product state space, S. For such preferences, we define relevant measures, show that they are treated as if they were the only marginals possibly governing the state space, and connect them with the measures appearing in the aforementioned representation. These results allow us to interpret relevant meas...
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作者：Halac, Marina; Yared, Pierre
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Warwick; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper studies the optimal level of discretion in policymaking. We consider a fiscal policy model where the government has time-inconsistent preferences with a present bias toward public spending. The government chooses a fiscal rule to trade off its desire to commit to not overspend against its desire to have flexibility to react to privately observed shocks to the value of spending. We analyze the optimal fiscal rule when the shocks are persistent. Unlike under independent and identicall...
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作者：Andersson, Tommy; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
作者单位：Lund University
摘要：In many real-life house allocation problems, rents are bounded from above by price ceilings imposed by a government or a local administration. This is known as rent control. Because some price equilibria may be disqualified given such restrictions, this paper proposes an alternative equilibrium concept, called rationing price equilibrium, tailored to capture the specific features of housing markets with rent control. An allocation rule that always selects a rationing price equilibrium is defin...
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作者：Guvenen, Fatih; Smith, Anthony A., Jr.
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; National Bureau of Economic Research; Yale University
摘要：This paper uses the information contained in the joint dynamics of individuals' labor earnings and consumption-choice decisions to quantify both the amount of income risk that individuals face and the extent to which they have access to informal insurance against this risk. We accomplish this task by using indirect inference to estimate a structural consumption-savings model, in which individuals both learn about the nature of their income process and partly insure shocks via informal mechanis...
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作者：Berry, Steven T.; Haile, Philip A.
作者单位：Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We present new identification results for nonparametric models of differentiated products markets, using only market level observables. We specify a nonparametric random utility discrete choice model of demand allowing rich preference heterogeneity, product/market unobservables, and endogenous prices. Our supply model posits nonparametric cost functions, allows latent cost shocks, and nests a range of standard oligopoly models. We consider identification of demand, identification of changes in...
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作者：Kaido, Hiroaki; Santos, Andres
作者单位：Boston University; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper examines the efficient estimation of partially identified models defined by moment inequalities that are convex in the parameter of interest. In such a setting, the identified set is itself convex and hence fully characterized by its support function. We provide conditions under which, despite being an infinite dimensional parameter, the support function admits n-consistent regular estimators. A semiparametric efficiency bound is then derived for its estimation, and it is shown that...
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作者：Glazer, Jacob; Rubinstein, Ariel
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of Warwick; Tel Aviv University; New York University
摘要：We study a principal-agent model in which the agent is boundedly rational in his ability to understand the principal's decision rule. The principal wishes to elicit an agent's true profile so as to determine whether or not to grant him a certain request. The principal designs a questionnaire and commits himself to accepting certain responses. In designing such a questionnaire, the principal takes into account the bounded rationality of the agent and wishes to reduce the success probability of ...
