作者：Agarwal, Nikhil; Somaini, Paulo
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University
摘要：Several school districts use assignment systems that give students an incentive to misrepresent their preferences. We find evidence consistent with strategic behavior in Cambridge. Such strategizing can complicate preference analysis. This paper develops empirical methods for studying random utility models in a new and large class of school choice mechanisms. We show that preferences are nonparametrically identified under either sufficient variation in choice environments or a preference shift...
作者：Nocke, Volker; Schutz, Nicolas
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Mannheim
摘要：We develop an aggregative games approach to study oligopolistic price competition with multiproduct firms. We introduce a new class of IIA demand systems, derived from discrete/continuous choice, and nesting CES and logit demands. The associated pricing game with multiproduct firms is aggregative and a firm's optimal price vector can be summarized by a uni-dimensional sufficient statistic, the -markup. We prove existence of equilibrium using a nested fixed-point argument, and provide condition...
