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作者：Chung, Kim-Sau; Ely, J. C.
摘要：Robert Wilson criticizes applied game theory's reliance on common-knowledge assumptions. In reaction to Wilson's critique, the recent literature of mechanism design has adopted the goal of finding detail-free mechanisms in order to eliminate this reliance. In practice this has meant restricting attention to simple mechanisms such as dominant-strategy mechanisms. However, there has been little theoretical foundation for this approach. In particular it is not clear the search for an optimal mech...
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作者：Blundell, Richard; Chiappori, Pierre-Andre; Magnac, Thierry; Meghir, Costas
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of Chicago; Columbia University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
摘要：We present identification and estimation results for the collective model of labour supply in which there are discrete choices, censoring of hours, and non-participation in employment. We derive the collective restrictions on labour supply functions and contrast them with restrictions implied by the usual unitary framework. Using the large changes in the wage structure between men and women in the U.K. over the last two decades, we estimate a collective labour supply model for married couples ...
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作者：Almazan, Andres; De Motta, Adolfo; Titman, Sheridan
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; McGill University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper presents a theory of location choice that draws on insights from the incomplete contracts and investment flexibility (real option) literatures. Our analysis indicates that the choice of locating within rather than away from industry clusters is influenced by the extent to which training costs are borne by firms versus employees. In addition, the uncertainty about future productivity shocks and the ability of firms to modify the scale of their operations also influence location choic...
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作者：Hornstein, Andreas; Krusell, Per; Violante, Giovanni L.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; University of Rochester; National Bureau of Economic Research; New York University
摘要：Does capital-embodied technological change play an important role in shaping labour-market outcomes? To address this question, we develop a model with vintage capital and search-matching frictions where irreversible investment in new vintages of capital creates heterogeneity in productivity among firms, matched as well as vacant. We demonstrate that capital-embodied technological change reduces labour demand and raises equilibrium unemployment and unemployment durations. In addition, the prese...
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作者：Gul, Faruk; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：We construct an infinite horizon model of harmful addiction. Consumption is compulsive if it differs from what the individual would have chosen had commitment been available. A good is addictive if its consumption leads to more compulsive consumption of the same good. We analyse the welfare implications of drug policies and find that taxes on drugs decrease welfare while prohibitive policies may increase welfare. We also analyse the agent's demand for voluntary commitment (rehab). For appropri...
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作者：Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus; Rubio-Ramirez, Juan F.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Duke University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta
摘要：This paper shows how particle filtering facilitates likelihood-based inference in dynamic macroeconomic models. The economies can be non-linear and/or non-normal. We describe how to use the output from the particle filter to estimate the structural parameters of the model, those characterizing preferences and technology, and to compare different economies. Both tasks can be implemented from either a classical or a Bayesian perspective. We illustrate the technique by estimating a business cycle...
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作者：Michelacci, Claudio; Lopez-Salido, David
摘要：We consider a version of the Solow growth model where technological progress can be investment specific or investment neutral. The labour market is subject to search frictions, and the existing productive units may fail to adopt the most recent technological advances. Technological progress can lead to the destruction of technologically obsolete jobs and cause unemployment. We calibrate the model to replicate the high persistence that characterizes the dynamics of firms' neutral technology and...
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作者：Miquel, Gerard Padro I.
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Autocrats in many developing countries have extracted enormous personal rents from power. In addition, they have imposed inefficient policies including pervasive patronage spending. I present a model in which the presence of ethnic identities and the absence of institutionalized succession processes allow the ruler to elicit support from a sizeable share of the population despite large reductions in welfare. The fear of falling under an equally inefficient and venal ruler that favours another ...
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作者：Weill, Pierre-Olivier
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：During financial disruptions, market makers provide liquidity by absorbing external selling pressure. They buy when the pressure is large, accumulate inventories, and sell when the pressure alleviates. This paper studies optimal dynamic liquidity provision in a theoretical market setting with large and temporary selling pressure and order-execution delays. I show that competitive market makers offer the socially optimal amount of liquidity, provided they have access to sufficient capital. If r...
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作者：Myatt, David P.
摘要：In a plurality-rule election, a group of voters must coordinate behind one of two challengers in order to defeat a disliked status quo. Departing from existing work, the support for each challenger must be inferred from the private observation of informative signals. The unique equilibrium involves limited strategic voting and incomplete coordination. This is driven by negative feedback: an increase in strategic voting by others reduces the incentives for a voter to act strategically. Strategi...
