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作者：Farhi, Emmanuel; Tirole, Jean
作者单位：Harvard University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper analyses the possibility and the consequences of rational bubbles in a dynamic economy where financially constrained firms demand and supply liquidity. Bubbles are more likely to emerge, the scarcer the supply of outside liquidity and the more limited the pledgeability of corporate income; they crowd investment in (out) when liquidity is abundant (scarce). We analyse extensions with firm heterogeneity and stochastic bubbles.
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作者：Blake, Andrew P.; Kirsanova, Tatiana
作者单位：University of Glasgow
摘要：We study stationary discretionary equilibria in dynamic linear-quadratic rational expectations models. Past papers have assumed that this is uniquely determined; we show that such models can have multiple equilibria in some situations. We demonstrate the existence of multiple discretionary equilibria using a number of examples of increasing complexity and discuss their potential to explain interesting economic phenomena. We investigate the general properties of discretionary equilibria and dis...
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作者：Crozet, Matthieu; Head, Keith; Mayer, Thierry
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of British Columbia
摘要：Empirical investigation of the quality interpretation of the Melitz (2003) model of firm heterogeneity and trade has been limited by the lack of direct data on quality. This paper matches firm-level export data with expert assessments of the quality of champagne producers to estimate the key parameters of that model. Quality monotonically increases firm-level prices, the probability of market entry, and export values. The estimated model-which calibrates the relative importance of firm-level q...
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作者：Waldinger, Fabian
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：This paper analyses peer effects among university scientists. Specifically, it investigates whether the quality and the number of peers affect the productivity of researchers in physics, chemistry, and mathematics. The usual endogeneity problems related to estimating peer effects are addressed by using the dismissal of scientists by the Nazi government in 1933 as a source of exogenous variation in the peer group of scientists staying in Germany. To investigate localized peer effects, I constru...
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作者：Harstad, Bard
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Oslo; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The paper presents a dynamic game where players contribute to a public bad, invest in technologies, and write incomplete contracts. Despite the n + 1 stocks in the model, the analysis is tractable and the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium unique. If only the contribution levels are contractible, then investments are suboptimally small if the contract is short term or close to its expiration date. To encourage investments, the optimal contract is more ambitious if it is short term, and it is...
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作者：Miller, David A.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：The game-theoretic literature on collusion has been hard pressed to explain why a cartel should engage in price wars, without resorting to either impatience, symmetry restrictions, inability to communicate, or failure to optimize. This paper introduces a new explanation that relies on none of these assumptions: if the cartel's member firms have private information about their costs, price wars can be optimal in the face of complexity. Specifically, equilibria that are robust to pay-off irrelev...
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作者：Calabrese, Stephen M.; Epple, Dennis N.; Romano, Richard E.
作者单位：Qatar Foundation (QF); Carnegie Mellon University in Qatar; Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：We examine the welfare effects of provision of local public goods in an empirically relevant setting using a multi-community model with mobile and heterogeneous households and with flexible housing supplies. We characterize the first-best allocation and show efficiency can be implemented with decentralization using head taxes. We calibrate the model and compare welfare in property-tax equilibria, both decentralized and centralized, to the efficient allocation. Inefficiencies with decentralizat...
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作者：Myatt, David P.; Wallace, Chris
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; University of Leicester
摘要：In the context of a beauty-contest coordination game (in which pay-offs depend on the quadratic distance of actions from an unobserved state variable and from the average action), players choose how much costly attention to pay to various informative signals. Each signal has an underlying accuracy (how precisely it identifies the state) and a clarity (how easy it is to understand). The unique linear equilibrium has interesting properties: the signals which receive attention are the clearest av...
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作者：Lester, Benjamin; Postlewaite, Andrew; Wright, Randall
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); University of Pennsylvania; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：What determines which assets are used in transactions? We develop a framework where the extent to which assets are recognizable determines the extent to which they are acceptable in exchange-i.e. it determines their liquidity. Recognizability and liquidity are endogenized by allowing agents to invest in information. We analyse the effects of monetary policy. There can be multiple equilibria, with different transaction patterns, and these patterns are not invariant to policy. We show that small...
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作者：Madarasz, Kristof
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：People exaggerate the extent to which their information is shared with others. This paper introduces the concept of such information projection and provides a simple but widely applicable model. The key application describes a novel agency conflict in a frictionless learning environment. When monitoring with ex post information, biased evaluators exaggerate how much experts could have known ex ante and underestimate experts on average. Experts, to defend their reputations, are too eager to bas...
