-
作者：Ackerberg, Daniel; Chen, Xiaohong; Hahn, Jinyong; Liao, Zhipeng
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Yale University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Many structural economics models are semiparametric ones in which the unknown nuisance functions are identified via non-parametric conditional moment restrictions with possibly non-nested or overlapping conditioning sets, and the finite dimensional parameters of interest are over-identified via unconditional moment restrictions involving the nuisance functions. In this article we characterize the semiparametric efficiency bound for this class of models. We show that semiparametric two-step opt...
-
作者：Stantcheva, Stefanie
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This article studies optimal linear and non-linear redistributive income taxation when there is adverse selection in the labour market. Unlike in standard taxation models, firms do not know workers' abilities, and competitively screen them through non-linear compensation contracts, unobservable to the government, in a Miyazaki-Wilson-Spence equilibrium. Adverse selection leads to different optimal tax formulas than in the standard Mirrlees (1971) model because of the use of work hours as a scr...
-
作者：Lewis, Gregory; Bajari, Patrick
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：Deadlines and late penalties are widely used to incentivize effort. Tighter deadlines and higher penalties induce higher effort, but increase the agent's risk. We model how these contract terms affect the work rate and time-to-completion in a procurement setting, characterizing the efficient contract design. Using new micro-level data on Minnesota highway construction contracts that includes day-by-day information on work plans, hours worked and delays, we find evidence of ex post moral hazard...
