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作者：Hoerner, Johannes; Morelli, Massimo; Squintani, Francesco
作者单位：Yale University; Bocconi University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Warwick
摘要：This article applies mechanism design to the study of international conflict resolution. Standard mechanisms in which an arbitrator can enforce her decisions are usually not feasible because disputants are sovereign entities. Nevertheless, we find that this limitation is inconsequential. Despite only being capable of making unenforceable recommendations, mediators can be equally effective as arbitrators. By using recommendation strategies that do not reveal that one player is weak to a strong ...
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作者：Mele, Antonio; Sangiorgi, Francesco
作者单位：Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); Universita della Svizzera Italiana; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：This article analyses costly information acquisition in asset markets with Knightian uncertainty about the asset fundamentals. In these markets, acquiring information not only reduces the expected variability of the fundamentals for a given distribution (i.e. risk). It also mitigates the uncertainty about the true distribution of the fundamentals. Agents who lack knowledge of this distribution cannot correctly interpret the information other investors impound into the price. We show that, due ...
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作者：Meng, Xin; Qian, Nancy; Yared, Pierre
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：This article studies the causes of China's Great Famine, during which 16.5 to 45 million individuals perished in rural areas. We document that average rural food retention during the famine was too high to generate a severe famine without rural inequality in food availability; that there was significant variance in famine mortality rates across rural regions; and that rural mortality rates were positively correlated with per capita food production, a surprising pattern that is unique to the fa...
