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作者：Ellingsen, Tore; Paltseva, Elena
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); New Economic School
摘要：If individuals own the right to take any action that they please, and are free to contract about behaviour, will outcomes be efficient in all situations? That is, does the Coase theorem hold? We study this classic question through the lens of a non-cooperative model of contract negotiations, considering both compulsory and voluntary participation in negotiations. In either case, we find that all consistent equilibria of the contracting game are efficient in the case of two players. But if part...
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作者：Deltas, George; Herrera, Helios; Polborn, Mattias K.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal
摘要：In elections with three or more candidates, coordination among like-minded voters is an important problem. We analyse the trade-off between coordination and learning about candidate quality under different temporal election systems in the context of the U.S. presidential primary system. In our model, candidates with different policy positions and qualities compete for the nomination, and voters are uncertain about the candidates' valence. This setup generates two effects: vote splitting (i.e. ...
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作者：Storeygard, Adam
作者单位：Tufts University
摘要：This article investigates the role of intercity transport costs in determining the income of sub-Saharan African cities. In particular, focusing on fifteen countries whose largest city is a port, I find that an oil price increase of the magnitude experienced between 2002 and 2008 induces the income of cities near that port to increase by 7% relative to otherwise identical cities 500 km farther away. Combined with external estimates, this implies an elasticity of city economic activity with res...
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作者：Alvarez, Fernando E.; Lippi, Francesco; Paciello, Luigi
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Sassari; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We study models where prices respond slowly to shocks because firms are rationally inattentive. Producers must pay a cost to observe the determinants of the current profit maximizing price, and hence observe them infrequently. To generate large real effects of monetary shocks in such a model the time between observations must be long and/or highly volatile. Previous work on rational inattentiveness has allowed for observation intervals that are either constant-but-long (e.g. Caballero, 1989 or...
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作者：Exley, Christine L.
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Decisions involving charitable giving often occur under the shadow of risk. A common finding is that potential donors give less when there is greater risk that their donation will have less impact. While this behaviour could be fully rationalized by standard economic models, this article shows that an additional mechanism is relevant: the use of risk as an excuse not to give. In a laboratory study, participants evaluate risky payoffs for themselves and risky payoffs for a charity. When their d...
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作者：Keister, Todd
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：Should policy makers be prevented from bailing out investors in the event of a crisis? I study this question in a model of financial intermediation with limited commitment. When a crisis occurs, the policy maker will respond with fiscal transfers that partially cover intermediaries' losses. The anticipation of this bailout distorts ex ante incentives, leading intermediaries to become excessively illiquid and increasing financial fragility. Prohibiting bailouts is not necessarily desirable, how...
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作者：Riedl, Arno; Rohde, Ingrid M. T.; Strobel, Martin
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：Coordination problems resembling weakest-link games with multiple Pareto ranked equilibria are ubiquitous in the economy and society. This makes it important to understand if and when agents are able to coordinate efficiently. Existing research on weakest-link games shows an overwhelming inability of people to coordinate on efficient equilibria, especially in larger groups. We show experimentally that freedom of neighbourhood choice overcomes the problem and leads to fully efficient coordinati...
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作者：Greaney, Brian P.; Kaboski, Joseph P.; Van Leemput, Eva
作者单位：Yale University; University of Notre Dame; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA
摘要：We provide an experimental and theoretical evaluation of a cost-reducing innovation in the delivery of self-help group microfinance services, in which privatized agents earn payments through membership fees for providing services. Under the status quo, agents are paid by an outside donor and offer members free services. In our multi-country randomized control trial, we evaluate the change in this incentive scheme on agent behaviour and performance, and on overall village-level outcomes. We fin...
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作者：Bordalo, Pedro; Gennaioli, Nicola; Shleifer, Andrei
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Harvard University
摘要：We present a model of market competition in which consumers' attention is drawn to the products' most salient attributes. Firms compete for consumer attention via their choices of quality and price. Strategic positioning of a product affects how all other products are perceived. With this attention externality, depending on the cost of producing quality some markets exhibit commoditized price salient equilibria, while others exhibit de-commoditized quality salient equilibria. When the costs of...
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作者：Stanton, Christopher T.; Thomas, Catherine
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：Online markets for remote labour services allow workers and firms to contract with each other directly. Despite this, intermediaries-called outsourcing agencies-have emerged in these markets. This article shows that agencies signal to employers that inexperienced workers are high quality. Workers affiliated with an agency have substantially higher job-finding probabilities and wages at the beginning of their careers compared to similar workers without an agency affiliation. This advantage decl...
