作者：Bagger, Jesper; Lentz, Rasmus
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We estimate an equilibrium on-the-job search model with endogenous search intensity. Workers differ by skill, firms by productivity. Workers respond to mismatch by intensive search, and sorting may result from complementarities in the match-level production function. The model is estimated on Danish-matched employeremployee data. Firms are ranked through revealed preference by the fraction of hires that is poached from other firms: the poaching rank. Identification is obtained by firm rank con...
作者：Azevedo, Eduardo M.; Budish, Eric
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Chicago
摘要：We propose a criterion of approximate incentive compatibility, strategy-proofness in the large (SP-L), and argue that it is a useful second-best to exact strategy-proofness (SP) for market design. Conceptually, SP-L requires that an agent who regards a mechanisms prices as exogenous to her reportube they traditional prices as in an auction mechanism, or price-like statistics in an assignment or matching mechanismuhas a dominant strategy to report truthfully. Mathematically, SP-L weakens SP in ...
