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作者：Cook, Cody; Diamond, Rebecca; Hall, Jonathan, V; List, John A.; Oyer, Paul
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Uber Technologies, Inc.; University of Chicago; Australian National University
摘要：The growth of the gig economy generatesworker flexibility that, some have speculated, will favour women. We explore this by examining labour supply choices and earnings among more than a million rideshare drivers on Uber in the U.S. We document a roughly 7% gender earnings gap amongst drivers. We showthat this gap can be entirely attributed to three factors: experience on the platform (learning-by-doing), preferences and constraints over where to work (driven largely by where drivers live and,...
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作者：McKay, Alisdair; Reis, Ricardo
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Should the generosity of unemployment benefits and the progressivity of income taxes depend on the presence of business cycles? This paper proposes a tractable model where there is a role for social insurance against uninsurable shocks to income and unemployment, as well as business cycles that are inefficient due to the presence of matching frictions and nominal rigidities. We derive an augmented Baily-Chetty formula showing that the optimal generosity of the social insurance system depends o...
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作者：Piguillem, Facundo; Riboni, Alessandro
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
摘要：Most fiscal rules can be overridden by consensus. We show that this does not make them ineffectual. Since fiscal rules determine the outside option in case of disagreement, the opposition uses them as bargaining chips to obtain spending concessions. We show that under some conditions this political bargain mitigates the debt-accumulation problem. We analyse various rules and find that when political polarization is high, harsh fiscal rules (e.g. government shutdown) maximize the opposition's b...
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作者：Clark, Daniel; Fudenberg, Drew; Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We introduce a new model of repeated games in large populations with random matching, overlapping generations, and limited records of past play. We prove that steady-state equilibria exist under general conditions on records. When the updating of a player's record can depend on the actions of both players in a match, any strictly individually rational action can be supported in a steady-state equilibrium. When record updates can depend only on a player's own actions, fewer actions can be suppo...
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作者：Smith, Lones; Sorensen, Peter Norman; Tian, Jianrong
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Copenhagen; University of Hong Kong
摘要：In the standard herding model, privately informed individuals sequentially see prior actions and then act. An identical action herd eventually starts and public beliefs tend to cascade sets where social learning stops. What behaviour is socially efficient when actions ignore informational externalities? We characterize the outcome that maximizes the discounted sum of utilities. Our four key findings are: (1) cascade sets shrink but do not vanish, and herding should occur but less readily as gr...
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作者：Donovan, Kevin
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：I consider the aggregate impact of low intermediate input intensity in the agricultural sector of developing countries. In a dynamic general equilibrium model with idiosyncratic shocks, incomplete markets, and subsistence requirements, farmers in developing countries use fewer intermediate inputs because it limits their exposure to uninsurable shocks. The calibrated model implies that Indian agricultural productivitywould increase by 16% if markets were complete, driven by quantitatively impor...
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作者：Donovan, Kevin
