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作者：Bhattacharya, Debopam; Dupas, Pascaline; Kanaya, Shin
作者单位：University of Cambridge; Stanford University; University of Essex; Kyoto University
摘要：Many real-life settings of individual choice involve social interactions, causing targeted policies to have spillover effects. This article develops novel empirical tools for analysing demand and welfare effects of policy interventions in binary choice settings with social interactions. Examples include subsidies for health-product adoption and vouchers for attending a high-achieving school. We show that even with fully parametric specifications and unique equilibrium, choice data, that are su...
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作者：Ghili, Soheil; Handel, Ben; Hendel, Igal; Whinston, Michael D.
作者单位：Yale University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Northwestern University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Reclassification risk is a major concern in health insurance where contracts are typically 1 year in length but health shocks often persist for much longer. While most health systems with private insurers pair short-run contracts with substantial pricing regulations to reduce reclassification risk, long-term contracts with one-sided insurer commitment have significant potential to reduce reclassification risk without the negative side effects of price regulation, such as adverse selection. We ...
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作者：Aryal, Gaurab; Murry, Charles; Williams, Jonathan W.
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Boston College; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine
摘要：We develop a model of inter-temporal and intra-temporal price discrimination by monopoly airlines to study the ability of different discriminatory pricing mechanisms to increase efficiency and the associated distributional implications. To estimate the model, we use unique data from international airline markets with flight-level variation in prices across time, cabins, and markets and information on passengers' reasons for travel and time of purchase. The current pricing practice yields appro...
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作者：Andre, Peter
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：Meritocracies aspire to reward hard work and promise not to judge individuals by the circumstances into which they were born. However, circumstances often shape the choice to work hard. I show that people's merit judgments are shallow and insensitive to this effect. They hold others responsible for their choices, even if these choices have been shaped by unequal circumstances. In an experiment, U.S. participants judge how much money workers deserve for the effort they exert. Unequal circumstan...
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作者：Backus, Matthew; Lewis, Greg
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study demand estimation in a large auction market. In our model, a dynamically evolving population of buyers with unit demand and heterogeneous and privately known preferences for a finite set of differentiated products compete in a sequence of auctions that occur in discrete time. We define an empirically tractable equilibrium concept in which bidders behave as though they are competing with the stationary distribution of opposing bids, characterize bidding strategies, and prove existence ...
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作者：Asriyan, Vladimir; Vanasco, Victoria
作者单位：ICREA; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Pompeu Fabra University; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We study the problem of a seller (e.g. a bank) who is privately informed about the quality of her asset and wants to exploit gains from trade with uninformed buyers (e.g. investors) by issuing securities backed by her asset cash flows. In our setting, buyers post menus of contracts to screen the seller, but the seller cannot commit to trade with only one buyer, i.e. markets are non-exclusive. We show that non-exclusive markets behave very differently from exclusive ones: (1) separating contrac...
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作者：Grotteria, Marco
作者单位：University of London; London Business School
摘要：I study, both empirically and theoretically, the economic and financial consequences of corporate lobbying. Firms lobby politicians to increase their share of government contracts, but political competition creates firm-level risk, inflating their cost of capital and reducing their incentive to invest in research and development (R&D). I document an annual 6-8% return premium for stocks of high-lobbying firms, which compensates investors for political risk. An estimated model in which firms ca...
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作者：Cruz, Jose-Luis; Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Chicago
摘要：Global warming is a worldwide and protracted phenomenon with heterogeneous local economic effects. We propose a dynamic economic assessment model of the world economy with high spatial resolution to assess its consequences. Our model features several forms of adaptation to local temperature changes, including costly trade and migration, local technological innovations, and local natality rates. We quantify the model at a 1 circle x1 circle resolution and estimate damage functions that determin...
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作者：Bodenstein, Martin; Corsetti, Giancarlo; Guerrieri, Luca
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; European University Institute
摘要：The gains from monetary policy cooperation depend on real and financial distortions in the economy and evolve dynamically with prevailing economic conditions. We show that, with international trade in assets, these gains are driven by asymmetric cross-border developments in productivity and savings, and can reach multiples of the cost of economic fluctuations. When financial flows are restricted to nonstate-contingent bonds, the gains from cooperation grow with the size of global imbalances, i...
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作者：Henn, Soeren J.; Mugaruka, Christian Mastaki; Ortiz, Miguel; de la Sierra, Raul Sanchez; Wu, David Qihang
作者单位：Newcastle University - UK; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This study presents a new economic perspective on state-building based on a case study in the Democratic Republic of the Congo's hinterland. We explore the implications for the state of considering rebels as stationary bandits. When the state, through a military operation, made it impossible for rebels to levy taxes, it inadvertently encouraged them to plunder the assets of the very citizens they previously preferred to tax. When it negotiated with rebels instead, this effect was absent, but n...
