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作者：Alviarez, Vanessa; Head, Keith; Mayer, Thierry
作者单位：Inter-American Development Bank; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); European Central Bank; Bank of France; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Large beer and spirits makers expanded abroad mainly by acquiring local brands. Exploiting market share data in 76 countries and changes in brand ownership from 2007 to 2018, we estimate that owners matter little for brand performance, except via a negative consumer response to foreign ownership. Counterfactuals indicate that market power increases were large enough to yield higher profits for most mergers without relying on fixed-cost savings. Emulating procompetition policies used by the Uni...
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作者：Mackay, Alexander; Miller, Nathan h.
作者单位：University of Virginia; Georgetown University
摘要：We consider the identification of empirical models of supply and demand with imperfect competition. We show that a restriction on the covariance between unobserved demand and cost shocks can resolve endogeneity and identify the price parameter. We demonstrate how to employ this approach in estimation, and we compare it to the method of instrumental variables. Our formal results also indicate that weaker covariance restrictions can bound the price parameter. We illustrate the covariance restric...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov; Talgam-cohen, Inbal; Zabarnyi, Konstantin
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study information aggregation with a decision-maker aggregating binary recommendations from symmetric agents. Each agent's recommendation depends on her private information about a hidden state. While the decision-maker knows the prior distribution over states and the marginal distribution of each agent's recommendation, the recommendations are adversarially correlated. The decision-maker's goal is choosing a robustly optimal aggregation rule. We prove that for a large number of agents for ...
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作者：Ball, Ian
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：I introduce a model of predictive scoring. A receiver wants to predict a sender's quality. An intermediary observes multiple features of the sender and aggregates them into a score. Based on the score, the receiver makes a decision. The sender prefers higher decisions, and she can distort each feature at a privately known cost. I characterize the scoring rule that maximizes decision accuracy. This rule underweights some features to deter sender distortion, and overweights other features so tha...
