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作者：Khalil, F; Parigi, BM
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要：We model risky lending with costly state verification, but without commitment to an audit strategy. The borrower under-reports with a positive probability in the successful state, and the lender audits with a positive probability after a report of failure. Under lack of commitment to audit probabilities, an increase in loan size convinces the borrower that the lender has a high stake in an audit. This reduces the probability of under-reporting and leads to overinvestment relative to the commit...
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作者：Bajaj, M; Chan, YS; Dasgupta, S
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We develop a signaling model to show how adverse selection and moral hazard interact to determine a firm's ownership structure and financing and investment decisions endogenously. Testable implications are derived regarding the relationship between insider ownership, performance measures such as Tobin's Q ratio, and elements of financial structure such as the debt-equity ratio.
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作者：Masters, AM
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：A matching model is used to analyze the effect of search frictions on incentives to invest in human and physical capital. Equilibrium involves inefficient (low) levels of investment. The source of the inefficiency cannot be attributed solely to either search or bargaining. Schemes that assist matching are Pareto-improving. While the ratio of workers to firms remains fixed, intermediaries that pay owners according to the amount of capital carried into the market are able to generate efficient o...
