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作者:Anderson, James E.; Milot, Catherine A.; Yotov, Yoto V.
作者单位:Boston College; Drexel University
摘要:We estimate geographic barriers to trade in nine service categories for Canada's provinces from 1997 to 2007 with novel high-quality bilateral provincial trade data. The border directly reduces average provincial trade with the United States relative to interprovincial trade to 2.4% of its borderless level. Incorporating multilateral resistance reduces foreign trade relative to interprovincial to 0.1% of its frictionless potential. Geography reduces services trade some seven times more than go...
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作者:Wolthoff, Ronald
作者单位:University of Toronto
摘要:Empirical evidence suggests that transitions between employment states are highly clustered around the first day of each workweek or month. I analyze the effect of this phenomenon by presenting an equilibrium search model in which the period length is a parameter determining the degree of clustering. Infinitesimally short periods result in a continuous-time model with bilateral meetings, whereas longer time periods introduce the possibility of recall or simultaneity of job offers. In this envi...
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作者:Baumeister, Christiane; Kilian, Lutz
作者单位:University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要:Central banks routinely use short-horizon forecasts of the quarterly price of oil in assessing the global and domestic economic outlook. We address a number of econometric issues specific to the construction of quarterly oil price forecasts in the United States and abroad. We show that quarterly forecasts of the real price of oil from suitably designed vector autoregressive models estimated on monthly data generate the most accurate real-time forecasts overall among a wide range of methods, in...
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作者:Giovannoni, Francesco; Makris, Miltiadis
作者单位:University of Bristol; University of Southampton
摘要:We consider auctions where bidders care about the reputational effects of their bidding and argue that the amount of information disclosed at the end of the auction will influence bidding. We focus on bid disclosure rules that capture all of the realistic cases. We show that bidders distort their bidding in a way that conforms to stylized facts about takeovers/licence auctions. We rank the disclosure rules in terms of their expected revenues and find that, under certain conditions, full disclo...