作者：Bos, Iwan; Harrington, Joseph E., Jr.
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This article examines endogenous cartel formation in the presence of a competition authority. Competition policy is shown to make the most inclusive stable cartels less inclusive. In particular, small firms that might have been cartel members in the absence of a competition authority are no longer members. Regarding the least inclusive stable cartels, competition policy can either decrease or increase their size and, in the latter case, the collusive price can rise.
作者：Mitchell, Matthew; Zhang, Yuzhe
作者单位：University of Toronto; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We study how to reward innovators who build on one another. Rewards come in the form of patents. Because patent rights are scarce, the optimal allocation involves sharing: More than one innovator's patent is in force at a given time. We interpret such allocations as patents that infringe one another as licensing through an ever growing patent pool and as randomization through litigation. We contrast the rate of technological progress under the optimal allocation with the outcome if sharing is ...
