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作者：Dupuy, Arnaud; Galichon, Alfred; Jaffe, Sonia; Kominers, Scott Duke
作者单位：University of Luxembourg; New York University; New York University; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Microsoft; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University
摘要：We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets where agents have heterogeneous preferences over potential partners. Our model provides a continuous link between models of matching with and without transfers. Taxes generate inefficiency on the allocative margin, by changing who matches with whom. This allocative inefficiency can be nonmonotonic, but is weakly increasing in the tax rate under linear taxation if each worker has negative nonpecuniary utility of working. We adapt ...
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作者：Citanna, Alex; Siconolfi, Paolo
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; Columbia University
摘要：We design a competitive market for exclusive contracts in large economies with observable types where trades are subject to postcontractual manipulations. We do not impose quantity restrictions at the trading stage-for example, incentive constraints on the consumption or production sets. We establish existence and constrained optimality of equilibrium. Our design can accommodate manipulations stemming from private information as well as from behavioral biases-for example, time inconsistency an...
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作者：Loenser, Christian; Schabert, Andreas
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：This article examines how financial constraints affect redistribution via monetary policy. We explore a novel mechanism of monetary nonneutrality, which is based on debt limits imposed in nominal terms. Specifically, when debt is constrained by current income, monetary policy can alter the real terms of borrowing. Changes in inflation exert ambiguous effects, depending on the initial debt/wealth position and the willingness to borrow. We show analytically that borrowers can benefit from increa...
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作者：Gauer, Florian; Kuzmics, Christoph
作者单位：University of Bielefeld; University of Graz
摘要：Two individuals are involved in a conflict situation in which preferences are ex ante uncertain. Although they eventually learn their own preferences, they have to pay a small cost if they want to secretly learn their opponent's preferences. We show that there is an interval with an upper bound less than 1 and lower bound greater than zero such that, for sufficiently small positive costs of information acquisition, in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the resulting game of incomplete informatio...
