作者：KANTOR, SE
摘要：This article attempts to explain why the adoption of potentially productive institutions is delayed and why inefficient ones persist by exploring the dynamics of institutional change in a particular historical case-the closing of the Georgia open range in the late nineteenth century. A closed range policy would have generated net benefits for specific regions of Georgia, but distributional conflicts, coupled with high transaction costs, made a voluntary agreement to do that unattainable. The a...
作者：JACOBY, D
摘要：Between the 1880s and 1930s, apprenticeship was transformed from an institution dominated by employers to one dominated by unions. Prior to this transformation, employers leveraged their ability to hire, fire, and discipline at will by requiring apprentices to post forfeitable performance bonds. Despite their financial interest in the resolution of contract disputes, employers who withheld employees' bonds judged their own cases. Agency theory helps explain the use and abuse of bonding schemes...
