Do major corporate customers deter supplier misconduct?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Jie; Su, Xunhua; Tian, Xuan; Xu, Bin; Zuo, Luo
• 署名单位: University of Leeds; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); Tsinghua University; University of Reading; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101; 1879-1980
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101801
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 101801
• 关键词: misconduct; Major customer; SUPPLIER; monitoring; Self-discipline; disclosure; culture; COSTS; RISK; firm

摘要

We examine whether major corporate customers can deter misconduct among their suppliers. Our findings indicate that firms with concentrated customer bases are less likely to commit misconduct and face lower penalties in equilibrium. We also observe a significant decline in supplier misconduct following the establishment of a major customer relationship. Furthermore, the deterrent effect of major customers is more pronounced when customer pressure to reduce supplier misconduct risk is higher. Additional analyses suggest that major customers exercise their exit option to penalize suppliers after acute violations. Overall, our results suggest that major customers play a crucial role in deterring supplier misconduct.