What director experience matters: A discussion of Donelson, Hutzler and Rhodes (2025)

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carter, Mary Ellen
• 署名单位: Boston College
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101; 1879-1980
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101816
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 101816
• 关键词: Boards; BUSY

摘要

Donelson, Hutzler, and Rhodes (this issue) examine the impact on firms' corporate governance of increased government antitrust enforcement against competitor interlocking directors. While these directors could facilitate collusion among firms, raising antitrust concerns, they also bring crucial industry expertise that enhances corporate governance. The authors find enhanced enforcement led to voluntary reductions in these directors. Given that these directors are associated with improved firm performance, investment efficiency, and CEO monitoring, the authors suggest that this enforcement will impair corporate governance. I discuss concerns around the narrow definition of director experience that limits the interpretation of the findings. I also discuss several open questions raised by the study and the opportunity this study provides to contribute to research on common ownership. Throughout I propose questions that future research might explore which would enhance our understanding of competitor interlocking directorates.