Antitrust risk and voluntary M&A disclosure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Oh, Jun
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101; 1879-1980
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2026.101884
• 发表日期: 2026-08
• 页码: 101884
• 关键词: ANTITRUST; Disclosure trade-off; FTC; DOJ; Voluntary M & A disclosure; acquisitions; INFORMATION; mergers; ENFORCEMENT; MARKET; FIRMS

摘要

I examine how antitrust risk affects firms' voluntary disclosure of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). I hypothesize that firms face a trade-off between the benefits of disclosing M&As to capital markets-namely, incorporating product market benefits into stock prices in a timely manner-and the potential antitrust scrutiny such disclosure can invite, which increases the likelihood of agencies challenging the M&A. Using two quasi-exogenous sources of variations in antitrust enforcement that affect the level of antitrust risk, I find a negative relation between antitrust risk and voluntary M&A disclosures in deal press releases, periodic SEC filings, and quarterly earnings conference calls. The effects are concentrated among managers with shortterm horizons, where the trade-off is most salient. Further analysis suggests that media coverage is one mechanism through which voluntary M&A disclosure poses antitrust risk. Collectively, my findings establish antitrust risk as a significant determinant of firms' voluntary disclosure.